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Contract and Choice 
* ** Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal 
This Article contributes to an ongoing debate, afoot in academic, legal, and 
policy circles, over the future of consumer arbitration. Utilizing a newly avail-
able database of credit card agreements, the Article offers an in-depth examina-
tion of dispute resolution practices within the credit card industry. In some re-
spects, the data cast doubt on the conventional wisdom about the pervasiveness 
of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and the presence of unfair terms. 
For example, the vast majority of credit card issuers do not utilize arbitration 
clauses, and by the end of 201 0, the majority of credit card debt was not sub-
ject to such an agreement. Likewise, while the use of class waivers is widespread 
in arbitration clauses, most clauses lack the sort of unfair procedural terms for 
which arbitration is often criticized. The upshot of these and other findings is 
that consumers, in some respects, have more choice in their contracts than the 
literature suggests. Our work also responds to the suggestions of some scholars 
that businesses favor arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts but not 
their business-to-business agreements. On the contrary, our research suggests 
that the difference may not be as dramatic as previous research suggests. These 
results hold important implications for ongoing policy debates, including the 
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act pending in Congress as well as the work of 
the newly minted and controversial Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB). Our findings suggest that the Arbitration Fairness Act may be based 
on faulty empirical premises and that the blanket prohibition contained in the 
Act may be overbroad. Our findings also provide a model that the CFPB might 
follow in conducting its statutorily required study of the use of arbitration 
clauses in consumer financial services contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have been the subject 
of much recent controversy. Central to this controversy has been the 
argument that consumers lack meaningful choice in deciding wheth-
er to accept arbitration as a precondition to their purchase of a good 
or service. This criticism has not been isolated to academic debates 
but has emerged in judicial, legislative, and regulatory debates over 
the future of arbitration. 1 
In the judicial sphere, a recurring refrain has been that arbitra-
tion agreements, particularly when coupled with a class waiver, are 
"unconscionable" and, thus, unenforceable under the savings clause 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 2- I 8. 
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to section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 2 A finding that an arbitra-
tion clause (indeed, any contract provision) is unconscionable typi-
cally requires both substantive unconscionability-unfairness in a 
particular provision or provisions of the contract-and procedural 
unconscionability-absence of meaningful choice by one party. 3 
Some courts find sufficient procedural unconscionability from the 
fact that an arbitration clause is in a standard form consumer con-
tract, without regard to actual market conditions; 4 others require 
consideration of whether the consumer had "meaningful choice" 
when entering into the contract. 5 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a sharply divided Supreme 
Court held that the FAA preempted application of California's un-
conscionability doctrine to make an arbitration clause in a consumer 
contract coupled with a class arbitration waiver unenforceable. 6 But 
the decision hardly heralded an end to the controversy surrounding 
the use of such clauses in consumer contracts. AT&T's clause con-
tained a number of distinctive features, such as attorney fees for pre-
vailing plaintiffs and a "reward" or "incentive" formula; other arbi-
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) ("save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the rev-
ocation of any contract"). 
3. See, e.g., 1 LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 8:30 (3d ed. 
2012) ("The unconscionability of an arbitration provision has both 'procedural' and 'substantive' 
elements."); 1 THOMAS H. 0EHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION§ 20:19 (rev. ed. 2011) ("An 
agreement can become unconscionable and unenforceable where it is both procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable, though both of these elements need not be present to the same de-
gree."); 21 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS§ 57:15 (4th ed. 2011) ("The courts are 
split on whether a party must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability to estab-
lish a valid defense to the attempted enforcement of an arbitration agreement, although most 
courts require a showing of both.") (footnote omitted); 2 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW§ 19.3 (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
4. E.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 498 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that "a contract may be procedurally unconscionable under California law when the 
parry with substantially greater bargaining power 'presents a "take-it-or-leave it" contract to a 
customer-even if the customer has a meaningful choice as to service providers'") (quoting 
Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). 
5. E.g., Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1135 (11th Cir. 2010) ("To 
determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable under Florida law, courts must 
look to: (1) the manner in which the contract was entered into; (2) the relative bargaining power 
of the parties and whether the complaining party had a meaningful choice at the time the con-
tract was entered into; (3) whether the terms were merely presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' 
basis; and (4) the complaining party's ability and opportunity to understand the disputed terms 
of the contract."). 
6. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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tration clauses lack such features_? California's rule was a blunt tool, 
amounting to a per se invalidation of class waivers in arbitration 
clauses; by contrast, other states employ more nuanced unconscion-
ability tests to class waivers.8 Other features of arbitration clauses, 
such as discovery and remedy limits, have also been subject to attack 
in litigation and academic criticism. 9 Indeed, before Concepcion even 
hit the United States reports, several lower courts invalidated arbi-
tration clauses in consumer contracts, assuring continued battles 
over the decision's sweep. 10 
In the legislative sphere, Congress has considered a variety of 
bills that, to various degrees, would invalidate pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements in consumer contracts. 11 As with the above-
described unconscionability challenges, one premise of these legisla-
tive efforts is that the consumer lacks a meaningful choice in decid-
ing whether to accept arbitration as a precondition to their purchase 
of a good or service. 12 Congress has already enacted some specialized 
bills, including most recently a provision of the Dodd-Frank financial 
reform law that prohibits pre-dispute arbitration clauses in residen-
7. Id. at I 744. 
8. Gordon v. Branch Banking & Trust, 419 F. App'x 920 (I lth Cir. 2011); jones v. Di-
recTV, Inc., 381 F. App'x 895 (11th Cir. 2010); Pendergast, 592 F.3d at 1119; Pleasants v. Am. 
Express Co., 541 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 
2007); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005); jenkins v. First 
Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005). 
9. Gilmer v. Interstate/johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 
544 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2008); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Caley, 428 
F.3d at 1359; Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003). 
10. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011), vacated sub nom., 
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S._ (2012) (per curiam); see also Chen-Oster v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2011 WL 2671813 (S.D.N.Y. 2011 ); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Ct. App. 2011); Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803 (N.M. 
2011). 
11. See, e.g., Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, §§ 11005, 
210, 122 Stat. 1357-58 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197(c) (2012)) (a 2008 statute that restricts 
the use of arbitration clauses in livestock and poultry production contracts); john Warner Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, §§ 670(a), 
987(1)(4), 120 Stat. 2267-68 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2012)) (a 2006 statute 
exempting members of the military and their dependents from arbitrating consumer credit dis-
putes); 21st Century Department of justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1836 (2002) (codified at IS U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012)). See generally 
PeLer B. Rutledge & Anna W. Howard, Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies and Individuals: Les-
sons from Abroad, 65 DIS!'. RESOL. J. 30, 32 (20 10). 
12. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, !12th Cong. § 2 (20 II). 
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tial-mortgage loans. 13 Previously, Congress enacted a little-known 
law that prohibited the use of arbitration clauses in consumer credit 
agreements with members of the armed forces. 14 More comprehen-
sive legislation, such as the Arbitration Fairness Act (which, in rele-
vant part, would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements in all 
consumer contracts), remains on the congressional agenda. 15 
Finally, in the regulatory sphere, interested parties eagerly await 
proposed rules from the newly created Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau (CFPB). The legislation creating the CFPB vested it with 
authority to issue rules regulating the use of arbitration clauses in 
consumer financial services contracts, including credit card agree-
ments.16 Before the CFPB can regulate, however, the CFPB must 
study and report to Congress on the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in such contracts. 17 The study has not yet been done, and it 
is too early to know what the rules will look like, although the CFPB 
has requested and received public comment "to help identify the ap-
propriate scope of the Study, as well as appropriate methods and 
sources of data for conducting the Study." 18 
The continued controversy in all three arenas-judicial, legisla-
tive, and regulatory-over the use of arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts necessitates systematic thinking about the principles un-
derlying the controversy. Whether directed at class waivers or some 
other feature of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, arguments 
against them take two different forms. In some instances, these ar-
guments rest on a normative proposition that a particular feature (or 
combination of features) of an arbitration clause should render the 
clause unenforceable. We call these "Type I challenges." A familiar 
reply to these Type I challenges has been that the consumer retains 
adequate alternatives. If the consumer prefers not to waive her right 
to a class action, she is free to choose another product provider, one 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R. 4173, Ill th Con g.§ 1414 (2010). 
14. 10 US.C. §§ 987(e)(3), (f)(4). 
15. Arbitration FairnessActof2011, H.R. 1873, 112thCong. (2011). 
16. 12 u.s.c. §§ 5481, 5518. 
17. /d.§5518(a). 
18. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting 
Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at 
http:/ /files.consumerfinance.gov /f/20 1204 _ cfpb _rfi _predispute-arbitration-agreements. pdf 
[hereinafter CFPB Request for Information]. 
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whose form contract does not contain an arbitration clause or whose 
contract contains an arbitration clause but without the offensive pro-
vision. 19 Because the consumer retains a modicum of choice, the 
consumer's choice of the particular agreement is voluntary and not 
the result of overreaching by the company. The plausibility of this 
response rests in part on an empirical proposition about the use of 
arbitration clauses within a given industry. 
In other instances, the argument against arbitration clauses 
sweeps more broadly. Some attacks on arbitration clauses posit both 
that an arbitration clause contains the offending provisions and that 
all (or most) contracts for a particular consumer good contain that 
provision. For example, in one case recently considered by the Flori-
da Supreme Court, a consumer challenged the enforceability of an 
arbitration clause contained in his cell phone agreement with 
Sprint/Nextel on the grounds that it contained a class arbitration 
waiver. 20 The consumer alleged that the offending provision was es-
pecially pernicious because, he alleged, all of Sprint's competitors in 
the Florida cell phone market also included class arbitration waivers 
in their subscriber agreements.Z 1 Like the Type I challenge, these 
challenges rest on a normative premise about the social desirability 
of a particular procedural right. They also rest critically on a positive 
premise-namely that the use of arbitration clauses within the in-
dustry is so pervasive in the relevant market that the consumer is 
19. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 20, Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119 
(II th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-10612-H), 2009 WL 5862576. 
20. Pendergast, 592 F.3d at 1135. 
21. The Florida Supreme Court recently declined to answer the question certified to it by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on the ground that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Concepcion obviated the certification and declined jurisdiction. See Pendergast 
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. SC10-19, 2012 WL 2948594 (Fla. july 17, 2012). The Eleventh Cir-
cuit recently held that the arbitration clause was enforceable, despite the class waiver, under 
Concepcion. See Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224 (lith Cir. 2012). In the interest 
of complete disclosure, it should be noted here that one of the authors, Professor Rutledge, filed 
in the Florida Supreme Court a brief amicus curiae in the Pendergast matter on behalf of an indus-
try association. The views expressed in this article reflect his own and not necessarily those of 
any entity involved in the litigation. 
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effectively denied a meaningful choice. 22 We call these "Type II chal-
lenges." 
This Article addresses the empirical premises underlying both 
types of arguments in an industry that has been at the center of the 
controversy over consumer arbitration-the credit card industry. As 
to Type I arguments, we consider the extent to which arbitration 
clauses employ particular features that have generated controversy, 
including class arbitration waivers and remedy limitations, among 
others. As to Type II arguments, we consider the pervasiveness of 
arbitration clauses among firms within an industry. To test these 
empirical questions, we again mine a rich (and largely untapped) da-
tabase of credit card agreements.23 This database allows us to take 
an exceptionally thorough snapshot of the dispute resolution choices 
made within the credit card industry. As noted above, that industry 
has been a central, though certainly not the only, battleground in 
these judicial, legislative, and regulatory debates. Our empirical 
study examines, among other things, the frequency with which arbi-
tration clauses are utilized, the features employed in those clauses, 
and the extent to which the drafter utilizes safeguards (like small-
claims carve-outs) to offset some effects of the arbitration clause. 
While our findings are unavoidably industry-specific, they carry im-
plications for the wider debates and offer a model for future empiri-
cal research. 
Our findings chart new ground. In some respects, they dispel 
certain misconceptions about the use of arbitration clauses within 
the industry; in other respects, they confirm the conventional wis-
dom. Perhaps most significantly, our research demonstrates that, 
contrary to widespread belief, the use of arbitration clauses among 
firms in the industry is not widespread-fewer than twenty percent of 
the credit card issuers employ arbitration clauses. When measured not by 
22. Lisa B. Bingham, Designing justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Con-
flict, 24 OHIO ST.]. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 24 n.111 (2008) ("I recognize some scholars would argue 
that there is consent to form contracts or adhesive arbitration clauses in personnel manuals be-
cause the prospective consumer or employee can simply walk away. However, when growing num-
bers of services providers and employers adopt these practices, there are no meaningful alternatives." (empha-
sis added)). 
23. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 
1103 (2011) [hereinafter Drahozal & Rutledge, Contract and Procedure]; Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 ]. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 536 (2012) [hereinafter Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card 
Agreements]. 
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firms but instead by the volume of credit card loans, the figure is 
larger. But still, as of December 31, 2010, less than half-only forty-
eight percent of the outstanding credit card loans in the industry-
are held by firms using arbitration clauses (down from ninety-five 
percent as of December 31, 2009, as a result of a civil settlement un-
der which several banks agreed to suspend their use of such clauses). 
Accordingly, many consumers who wish to avoid arbitration clauses 
in their credit card agreements likely have more options than com-
monly believed. 
Our findings on the terms of such clauses are equally revealing. 
Nearly seventy percent of firms employing such clauses included some form of 
small-claims carve-out like that provided by the arbitration clause in the Con-
cepcion decision. (As a practical matter, the proportion is likely even 
higher, because essentially all of the clauses provide for either the 
American Arbitration Association or JAMS to administer the arbitra-
tions, and the Due Process Protocols followed by those providers al-
so require a small-claims carve-out.) This finding casts doubt on crit-
icisms that arbitration clauses completely foreclose a right of access to 
court. At the same time, other findings support the view that arbitra-
tion reconfigures how court is accessed-specifically, the unavailabil-
ity of the class mechanism. Nearly ninety-five percent of arbitration 
clauses in our sample employ class waivers; when measured not by 
firms but instead by loan volume, the figure jumps to over ninety-
nine percent. 
Finally, our findings address ideas discussed by Ted Eisenberg, 
Geoff Miller, and Emily Sherwin about the comparative utilization of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and other sorts of con-
tracts. According to Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin, companies sup-
port the use of arbitration clauses in the consumer context, because 
they are an effective device for avoiding class actions, but they gener-
ally eschew such clauses in their contracts with other businesses. 
Contrary to this view, our research does not identify any clear difference in 
the utilization of arbitration clauses with respect to consumer credit card and 
bank account agreements as opposed to business agreements. Admittedly, our 
findings are modest-they are based on a limited sample set in a sin-
gle industry. Nonetheless, they suggest that the Eisenberg, Miller, 
and Sherwin proposition cannot be automatically accepted and, at a 
minimum, demands further examination. 
These findings carry important implications for the ongoing judi-
cial, legislative, and regulatory debates in this field. On the judicial 
8 
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front, they suggest that the empirical premises underpinning the 
Type I and, especially, the Type II challenges demand closer exami-
nation. Blunt judicial rejection of arbitration clauses (or arbitration 
clauses with particular features) can overlook the more nuanced, so-
phisticated practices of companies (like AT&T and some banks) that 
attempt to ensure that arbitration does not deprive consumers of a 
meaningful choice. On the legislative front, our findings lend further 
support to our previously stated view that legislative debates in this 
field can suffer from faulty assumptions about the use (or non-use) 
of arbitration clauses; the variation within the credit card industry 
suggests that the use of arbitration clauses reflects firm-specific con-
siderations, perhaps in reaction to various economic realities, that 
Congress must understand more fully before it acts. Finally, on the 
regulatory front, our findings provide a possible model for the CFPB 
to use as it conducts its broader statutorily mandated study of the 
use of arbitration clauses in consumer financial services contracts. 
This Article develops the foregoing arguments in three parts. 
Part I reviews the literature on the use of arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts, paying particular attention to the increased im-
portance of empirical legal research in this field. Part II discusses our 
findings on the use of arbitration clauses within the credit card in-
dustry, including a detailed examination of the provisions of credit 
card arbitration clauses (such as the role of carve-outs and opt-outs 
from arbitration and the extent to which such clauses employ con-
troversial features such as remedy limitations), and variations in pat-
terns based on the type of account. Part III explores the implications 
of our research for the above-described judicial, legislative, and regu-
latory debates as well as the ongoing academic research in this field. 
I. BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the use of arbitration clauses in consumer con-
tracts developed in response to several strands of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence in the 1980s and 1990s. One line of decisions stretched 
the Federal Arbitration Act into state court proceedings and limited 
the ability of states to refuse enforcement of arbitration clauses un-
der their consumer protection laws. The Court held in Southland 
Corp. v. Keating that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (setting 
forth a substantive standard governing the enforceability of domestic 
9 
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arbitration agreements) applied in state court.24 It subsequently held 
in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson that section 1 of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (setting forth an interstate commerce requirement) 
represented an expansive exercise of Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce rather than the narrower conception of Con-
gress's commerce power that prevailed at the time of the FAA's en-
actment in 1925.25 A second line of decisions interred the nonarbi-
trability doctrine and required Congress to speak clearly if it wished 
to declare a class of claims nonarbitrable. Decisions such as Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon26 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. 27 accomplished this result in the securities 
context, and subsequent decisions like Gilmer v. Interstate/johnson Lane 
Corp.28 set forth a framework that governed federal statutory claims 
generally. These lines of decisions made possible the widespread use 
of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts29 and spawned several 
eras of academic literature on the topic. 
Early scholarship on arbitration clauses in consumer contracts 
was decidedly not empirical.3° For example, one early critic could 
confidently declare that: 
24. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
25. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-75 (1995). 
26. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
27. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
28. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
29. To state the obvious, our focus here is on domestic practice in the United States. As 
we have each noted elsewhere, practices in Europe and the rest of the world are quite different. 
See Rutledge & Howard, supra note 11, at 30; Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, A 
Comparative View of Consumer Arbitration, 71 ARB. 131 (2005). 
30. For exemplary literature, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and juris-
diction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhe-
sion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: 
The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 
UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage 
Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039 (1998); DavidS. Schwartz, Enforcing Small 
Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute 
[Mandatory} Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 
BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class 
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. I (2000) [hereinafter Sternlight, 
Class Action]; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q 637 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate 
Tool?]. 
10 
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By requiring customers and employees, through standardized 
contracts across entire markets, to agree in advance to sub-
mit all potential violations of common-law and statutory 
rights to arbitration-where defense costs and judgments 
will on the whole be less than under a regime of judicial en-
forcement-corporate defendants have begun to deregulate 
themselves. 31 
Such arguments provided the intellectual basis for the Type I 
challenges described above. But they hardly offered a bulwark to pro-
tect against the typical response to the Type I challenge ("If consum-
ers do not like arbitration clauses, or arbitration clauses with par-
ticular features, then they may purchase another product."). Nor did 
such arguments offer any support for the Type II challenge (that is, a 
statement about the pervasive use of arbitration clauses or arbitra-
tion clauses with objectionable features in a particular industry). 
Of course, early pioneers in this field of scholarship could hardly 
be faulted for the lack of empirical support. Good empirical evidence 
about the use of arbitration clauses-whether within a particular in-
dustry or across industries-was extraordinarily hard to come by. 
Ordinarily, companies were not obligated to disclose their arbitration 
agreements systematically in a form usable by researchers. While 
their customers received copies of the contracts, others could not 
readily obtain them. To the extent such agreements were available, 
this was only because the agreement was published in some form 
(such as a judicial opinion in a case challenging the agreement) or 
because the agreement was included as part of a disclosure obliga-
tion designed to serve some other purposes (such as disclosure obli-
gations under franchise or securities laws). 
The next generation of scholarship sought to fill this gap in the 
literature through some old-fashioned gumshoeing. Some research-
ers contacted companies and requested copies of their arbitration 
agreements. Amy Schmitz's research into the credit card and cellular 
telephone industries made an important contribution in this re-
31. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 132. A steadfast critic of arbitration clauses in consumer 
and employment contracts, Professor Schwartz has also been highly skeptical of the view that 
the policy debates described in Part I should be resolved on empirical grounds at all. For a recent 
exposition of this view, see David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
IND. L.J. 239 (2012). 
11 
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gard. 32 Other scholars went one step further and, in a bit of self-
sacrifice for the sake of knowledge, went about obtaining products 
(such as credit cards) in order to have access to those agreements. 
An especially important contribution to this literature was the path-
breaking work of Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler, who sought 
to undertake one of the first inter-industry studies of the use and 
terms of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.33 This permitted 
some more robust, albeit tentative, conclusions such as their finding 
that 30.8% of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts contained 
class action waivers.34 Studies like Demaine and Hensler's helped to 
build the empirical architecture by which the positive premises of 
Type I and Type II challenges could be meaningfully assessed. 
While studies like Demaine and Hensler's made an important 
contribution to the literature, they too suffered from shortcomings. 
Many studies of this generation suffered from unusually small sam-
ples, thereby precluding any statistically significant results. Moreo-
ver, the data gathered through the studies was unavoidably unsys-
tematic. Researchers who attempted to contact companies 
necessarily were at the mercy of voluntary compliance by the compa-
nies. Researchers who attempted to obtain the products necessarily 
were limited by the amount they were willing to pay (one can only 
have so many credit cards!). Finally, much of this research tended to 
be limited to a single point in time and did not permit any sort of 
meaningful assessment of trends over a longer time span. Despite 
these shortcomings, this generation of research provided an im-
portant template for further empirical scholarship. 
Most recently, scholars have sought to develop more rigorous 
sets of empirical data to evaluate more systematically the use of arbi-
32. Amy]. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration 
Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 143-50 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitz, Legislating in the 
Light] (analyzing small samples of credit card and cell phone contracts); Amy]. Schmitz, Dangers 
of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.j. 3 7 (2007) (examining telecommunications 
contracts); Amy j. Schmirz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO 
ST. j. ON DISP. RESOL. 627 (2008) (same); see also W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Indi-
viduation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 85 n.102 (2007) (reviewing agreements in thirty-two AAA 
awards and finding that five of the sixteen consumer agreements contained class waivers, but 
none of the sixteen employment agreements contained such provisions). 
33. Linda j. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62, 64 
(2004) (finding arbitration agreements in 69.2o/o of consumer contracts in the financial services 
industry, although the sample size was relatively small). 
34. I d. at 65. 
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tration clauses in consumer contracts and other settings.35 The work 
of renowned empirical scholar Ted Eisenberg has been critical in this 
regard. In a series of papers coauthored in various combinations with 
Geoffrey Miller and Emily Sherwin, Eisenberg compared consumer 
contracts with business contracts in securities filings by publicly 
traded companies. 36 Eisenberg and his coauthors concluded, in rele-
vant part, that over seventy-five percent of financial services and tel-
ecommunications companies utilized arbitration clauses in their 
consumer agreements.37 Such findings finally offered the empirical 
tools to assess the response to the Type I challenges and also laid the 
intellectual groundwork for the Type II challenges that make claims 
about the pervasive use of arbitration clauses (or arbitration clauses 
with specific terms) within a particular industry. 
While pathbreaking, Eisenberg's research is not foolproof. Else-
where, one of us has explained the limited explanatory value of some 
of their findings. 38 Moreover, Eisenberg's dataset necessarily con-
strains his findings in two distinct ways. They are limited to a single 
point in time and, therefore, do not lend themselves to a more dy-
namic analysis. They also offer, at best, an incomplete snapshot of 
the industry. To the extent Eisenberg et al. draw their data from con-
35. For examples of scholarship outside the consumer context, see Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.j. 275 (2009) (analyzing franchise agreements); Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 80 
(2008) [hereinafter Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration] (analyzing franchise agree-
ments); Erin A. O'Hara O'Connor, Kenneth]. Thomas & Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Em-
ployment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133 (2012) (finding that 51.5% of CEO contracts contained 
arbitration clauses); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Em-
ployment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 257 (2006) 
(finding that 41.6% of CEO contracts contained arbitration clauses). 
36. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: 
An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 871, 882-83 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer So/dim] (finding 
that over 75% of financial services and telecommunications companies used arbitration clauses 
in consumer agreements and over 93% used arbitration clauses in CEO employment agree-
ments); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for Cus-
tomers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 
jUDICATURE 118, 121 (2008) (same); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from 
Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) (examining the use of arbitration clauses in material contracts in 
SEC filings). 
37. Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers, supra note 36. 
38. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen]. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitra-
tion Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST.j. ON 0ISP. RESOL. 433 (2010). 
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tracts attached to SEC filings, they necessarily miss contracts that 
are not attached to those filings, either because the companies are 
not subject to reporting requirements or because the company's re-
porting requirements do not extend to particular contracts that 
might shed more light on a company's practices. 
Given the state of the literature, the natural next step is to de-
velop an empirical assessment of arbitration clause practices in con-
sumer contracts that seeks to avoid the shortcomings in Eisenberg's 
data. This enables a fuller assessment of both the response to the 
Type I challenge and the validity of the Type II challenge, described 
above. The next Part explains how the Credit CARD Act of 2009 
provided such a mine of data with respect to practices in the credit 
card industry. 
II. WHAT Do ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CREDIT CARD AGREEMENTS 
LOOK LIKE? 
This Part undertakes a comprehensive examination of the use of 
arbitration clauses in credit card agreements. 39 It first examines 
trends in the use of arbitration clauses: to what extent do issuers 
provide for arbitration of disputes and to what extent can cardhold-
ers opt out of the obligation to arbitrate? It then takes a detailed 
look at the provisions included in arbitration clauses in credit card 
agreements. Finally, it compares the use of arbitration clauses in 
business credit card and deposit account agreements to the use of 
arbitration clauses in consumer credit card and deposit account 
agreements. 
A. Sample 
The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure 
Act (Credit CARD Act) of 2009 requires all issuers to provide elec-
tronic copies of their consumer credit card agreements to the Federal 
Reserve, 40 which, in turn, is to "establish and maintain on its public-
39. As such, this study is an "inter-firm study"-it compares the use of arbitration claus-
es across firms in a single industry (although the part of the study examining carve-outs from 
arbitration, see infra text accompanying notes 59-64, is an "intra-contract" study because it looks 
at the use of arbitration to resolve different types of disputes within the same contract). See 
Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 35. 
40. Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, § 204(a), 123 Stat. 1734, 1746-47 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d)(2) (2012)). 
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ly available Internet site a central repositof{' of the consumer credit 
card agreements received from creditors."4 Our sample consists of 
293 credit card agreements submitted by issuers to the Federal Re-
serve as of December 31, 2009 and 2010, and made available via the 
Internet.42 We collected the arbitration clauses, if any, from the cred-
it card agreements and classified the provisions of the clauses as de-
scribed throughout this Pan.43 
We report our findings by number of issuers and by market 
share of the issuer, as measured by its share of the dollar value of 
credit card loans outstanding for all issuers in the relevant sample. 
Data on the amount of credit card loans outstanding come from the 
December 31, 2009, and December 31, 2010, call reports filed by is-
suers with the appropriate federal regulators. Our sample is limited 
to those issuers for which such data is available.44 
41. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d)(3) (2012)). At the time we collected the data, the 
credit card agreements were available on a web page maintained by the Federal Reserve. Subse-
quently, responsibility for making credit card agreements publicly available has shifted to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which now posts the agreements on its web page. Credit 
Card Agreement Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
42. The starting point for the sample is the sample used in Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, supra note 23, at 551-52 (for credit card agreements as of 
December 31, 2009). To that sample we added new issuers submitting credit card agreements as 
of December 31, 2010 (which were filed prior to june 1, 2011), and identified agreements from 
issuers in the original sample that had been updated as of December 31,2010. We also excluded 
five issuers for which credit card agreements were no longer available as of December 31, 2010. 
Issuers almost always specified the same form of dispute resolution in each credit card agree-
ment they submitted to the Federal Reserve-i.e., when an issuer used an arbitration clause, it 
typically used an identical clause in all of its agreements. In the handful of cases in which an is-
suer submitted credit card agreements specifYing different forms of dispute resolution or with 
different arbitration clauses, we used the most common form in our analysis. For further discus-
sion, see id. The one exception is HSBC, which settled an antitrust suit by agreeing not to use 
arbitration clauses in its credit card agreements for three-and-one-half years. See infra text ac-
companying notes 53-54. The standard HSBC credit card agreements for December 31, 2010, do 
not contain arbitration clauses, consistent with the settlement. But those agreements are out-
numbered by specialty credit card agreements that HSBC apparently administers for merchants, 
which do include arbitration clauses. Because the standard HSBC agreement does not include an 
arbitration clause, and because HSBC has agreed not to use arbitration clauses, we coded HSBC 
as not using arbitration as of December 31, 2010. 
43. Issuers were only required to update their filing if they amended the credit card 
agreement during the quarter. 12 C.F.R. § 226.58(c) (3) (2011). Accordingly, when the most 
recent filing available was for December 31, 2009, we also used that filing for December 31, 
2010. 
44. As a result, our sample is limited to financial institutions (almost always banks and 
credit unions) and does not include nonfinancial institutions. See MARK FURLETTI & 
CHRISTOPHER O!W, MEASURING U.S. CREDIT CARD BORROWING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE G.l9'S 
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The number of reported observations varies. When we examine 
the use of arbitration clauses, we use the full sample of 293 credit 
card agreements. When we examine the terms of arbitration clauses 
as of December 31, 20 l 0, we use a sample of forty-seven issuers that 
included arbitration clauses in their credit card agreements as of that 
date. 45 When we examine the change in the terms of arbitration 
clauses between 2009 and 2010, we limit the sample to the thirty-
nine issuers that had arbitration clauses in both of those years, so 
that we can focus on changes in the terms while holding the use of 
arbitration constant. 
B. Trends in the Use of Arbitration Clauses 
Until recently, credit card agreements have been a standard ex-
ample of a consumer contract that always, or almost always, included 
an arbitration clause. Most often, commentators (accurately) stated 
that most credit card agreements included arbitration clauses.46 Less 
often (and less accurately), commentators sometimes stated that 
most credit card issuers included arbitration clauses in their credit 
ESTIMATE OF CONSUMER REVOLVING CREDIT 15 (2006), available at http://www.phi!adelphiafed 
.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2006/DG 192006April1 O.pdf (de-
scribing the "complexities of gathering data on the revolving consumer loans owed to nonfinan-
cial businesses"). We did not include two new issuers in the sample that reported zero dollars in 
credit card loans outstanding as of December 31, 2010. By comparison, several issuers that had 
nonzero amounts of credit card loans outstanding as of December 31, 2009, reported zero credit 
card loans outstanding as of December 31, 2010. We kept those issuers in the sample, although 
they obviously affected only the number of agreements and not the market-share calculations. 
45. Two credit unions indicated in their credit card agreements that disputes were subject 
to arbitration under the terms of an arbitration clause included in the credit union membership 
agreement. Because disputes under the credit card agreement were subject to arbitration, we 
included the two credit unions as issuers that used arbitration clauses. But because the arbitra-
tion clause itself was not available, we treated those credit unions as missing when analyzing the 
terms of credit card arbitration clauses. 
46. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (finding that 
consumers "must often give up their rights as a condition of ... getting a credit card"); 
PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND EVERYWHERE 3 (2009), available at 
http:/ /www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf (reporting that "the use of forced 
arbitration remains rampant," citing credit card agreements as an example); Alex Raskolnikov, 
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 747 
(2009) ("A binding arbitration clause is a staple of credit card agreements."); Yuki Noguchi, 
Credit Card Arbitration Trumps Lawsuits, Court Says, NPR.ORG Qan. 1 1, 2012), http://www.npr.org/ 
2012/01/ll/144990644/credit-card-arbitration-trumps-lawsuits-court-says ("To ger a credit 
card, a consumer generally must sign a detailed agreement. Jn the fine print, almost always, is an 
arbitration clause that says that if consumers want to dispute fees, they must do so through arbi-
tration, not in court."). 
16 
1 Contract and Choice 
card agreementsY The limited empirical evidence in support of 
those statements focused on the very largest credit card issuers,48 
which, given the degree of concentration in the credit card market, 
provided a reasonable view of what most credit card agreements in-
cluded. But because the studies focused on the very largest issuers, 
they provided little evidence of what most issuers did. 
In this Part, we provide a broader view of trends in the use of ar-
bitration clauses in credit card agreements.49 First, we examine the 
use of arbitration clauses across a broad range of issuers. Second, we 
look at the extent to which arbitration clauses in credit card agree-
ments carve certain types of claims or disputes out of the obligation 
to arbitrate. Third, we consider the extent to which credit card 
agreements permit consumers to opt out of the arbitration clause. 
Our data, although the most recent data available at the time of this 
writing, predate the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Concepcion, so 
that we do not examine how credit card issuers responded to that 
decision. 
1. Use of arbitration clauses 
As of December 31, 2009, most credit card agreements included 
arbitration clauses, but most credit card issuers did not use arbitra-
tion clauses. As shown in Table 1, 95.1% of the dollar value of out-
47. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry Using It to Quash Legal Claims?: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 111 th 
Con g. 1-2 (2009), available at http:/ /judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111 th/111-39 _ 49475 
.PDF ("Nearly every credit card issuer includes an arbitration agreement in [its] . . contracts 
with cardholders.") (statement of Rep. Steve Cohen, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Commercial 
and Admin. Law); see also Samuel lssacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 157, 158 n.6 (2006) (referring to "the few credit card companies that do not com-
pel arbitration"). 
48. E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 46, at 5-9; Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Sol-
diers, supra note 36, at 881-82. 
49. Prior to enactment of the Credit CARD Act of 2009, see supra text accompanying notes 
40-41, credit card agreements were difficult for researchers to obtain. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
supra note 46, at 3, 5 (" [S]everal credit card companies told us that we had to apply for a credit 
card and be approved before we could see their terms .... Only three of the 10 credit card 
providers we queried would share the contractual language of their arbitration clauses with 
us."); Demaine & Hensler, supra note 33, at 60 (" [O]ne coauthor acquired four credit cards 
while conducting the study, as that was the only means by which to obtain the clauses used by 
these businesses."); Schmitz, Legislating in the Light, supra note 32, at 145 ("[1]t was notably diffi-
cult to obtain copies of consumer credit contracts in order to analyze their inclusion of arbitra-
tion clauses .... [Credit card issuers] rarely include or make available their full form contract 
terms."). 
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standing credit card loans in the sample was subject to credit card 
agreements with arbitration clauses. But only 17.4% of credit card 
issuers in the sample included arbitration clauses in their credit card 
agreements. 50 A minority of very large issuers used arbitration 
clauses; the majority of much smaller issuers did not. 
Table 1. Use of Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements 
(2009 & 2010) 
Contracts as of 12/31/09 Contracts as of 12/31/10 
Number of o/o of credit Number o/o of credit 
Clauses card loans of Clauses card loans 
outstanding outstanding 
No Arbitra~ 242 4.9% 250 52.0% 
tion Clause (82.6%) (85.3%) 
Arbitration 51 95.1% 43 48.0% Clause (17.4%) (14.7%) 
Totals 293 100.0% 293 100.0% (100.0%) (100.0%) 
In mid-to-late 2009, two events occurred that had a significant 
effect on the use of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements. 
First, in July 2009, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) settled a 
consumer fraud lawsuit with the Minnesota Attorney General by 
agreeing to stop administering new consumer arbitration cases. 51 
50. Based on the sample used in Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card 
Agreements, supra note 23, at 551-52, we reported that, as of December 31,2009,51 of298 issu-
ers (17.1 %) used arbitration clauses and 247 of 298 issuers (82.6'Vo) did not; and that 95.1% of 
credit card loans outstanding were subject to arbitration clauses while 4.9% were not. These 
results differ marginally from the results reported in Table 1 because of the slight difference in 
the samples used. For the results reported in this article, the sample is limited to those issuers 
for which we had information as of both December 31,2009, and December 31, 2010. Credit 
card agreements were not available as of December 31, 2010, for five issuers that had provided 
credit card agreements to the Federal Reserve as of December 31,2009 (none of which included 
arbitration clauses), so we excluded those issuers from the sample. 
51. Consent Judgment, Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-
18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. july 17, 2009), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/ nafcon-
sentdecree.pdf. At the same time, but unrelated to pending or threatened litigation, the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association announced a moratorium on administering most consumer debt 
collection arbitrations. See Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Con-
sumer Debts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight, 1 11th Con g. 
123-32 (2009) (testimony of Richard W. Naimark, American Arbitration Ass'n), available at 
http:/ /oversight.house.gov/images/stories/ documents/20090722112616.pdf. 
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Prior to the settlement, the NAF had the largest caseload of consum-
er arbitrations (almost all debt collection arbitrations) in the United 
States. 52 
Second, in December 2009, four of the largest credit card issuers 
settled a pending antitrust suit (Ross v. Bank of America) by agreeing 
to remove arbitration clauses from their consumer and small busi-
ness credit card agreements for three-and-one-half years. 53 Bank of 
America, Capital One, Chase, and HSBC were the settling defend-
ants; other large issuers-Citibank and Discover Bank (with Ameri-
can Express and Wells Fargo alleged to be co-conspirators but not 
named as defendants)-remained in the case and continue to use ar-
bitration clauses. 54 
Table 1 illustrates the effect of those two events on the use of ar-
bitration clauses in credit card agreements. 55 The percentage of issu-
52. Complaint at Cf 3, Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-
18559, (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/ PressRe-
leases/SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCompany.pdf. 
53. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with Bank of America, N.A. (USA) (N/K/A/ 
FIA Card Services, N.A.) and Bank of America, N.A., at 10, Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., (USA), 
No. 05-CV-7116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement. 
com/ documents/files/20 I 0--02-23-stip-and -agreement-with -bank -of-america. pdf; Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement with Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. and Capital One, N.A., at 10, Ross v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., (USA), No. 05-CV-71 16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http:/ 1\vww. arbi tration.ccfsettlement.com/ documents/files/20 I 0-02-23-stip-and-agreement-
with-capital-one.pdf; Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and 
Chase Bank USA, N.A., at 10, Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., (USA), No. 05-CV-7116 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 23, 201 0), available at http:/ /www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/2010-02-
23-stip-and-agreement-with-chase.pdf; Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with HSBC 
Finance Corp. and HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., at 11, Ross. v. Bank of Am., N.A., (USA), No. 05-
CV-7116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010), available at http://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/ doc-
uments/files/20 I 0-02-24-s tip-and-agreement -with -hsbc. pdf. 
54. See First Amended Class Action Complaint at C[C[ 45-58, 69-77, Ross v. Bank of Am., 
N.A., (USA), No. 05-CV-7116 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2009), available at http://www.arbitration. ccf-
sertlemen t .com/ document s/fil es/2009 -06-04-1 st -amended-complaint. pdf. 
55. We are not able to separate out the relative importance of the two events, nor are we 
able to identify which is the cause and which is the effect. Chase announced in July 2009 that it 
would no longer file new credit card arbitration cases against consumers, and Bank of America 
announced in August 2009 that it would stop using arbitration clauses in its credit card and oth-
er consumer agreements. See Kathy Chu, Bank of America Ends Arbitration of Credit Card Disputes, 
USA TODAY ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2009, 11:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/ind us-
tries/banking/2009-08-13-bank-of-america-no-arbitration _N.htm. The settlements by Chase and 
Bank of America in Ross were not announced until November and December 2009, at around the 
same time as the settlements by Capital One and HSBC. See Ravi Panchal, BofA Reaches Settlement 
in Cardholders Arbitration Case, SNL BANK WKLY. S. EDITION (SNL Fin. LC, Charlottesville, Va.), 
Dec. 21, 2009; Pankti Mehta, Capital One Agrees to Drop Arbitration Clause from Credit Card Agree-
ments, SNL BANK WKLY. S. EDITION, (SNL Fin. LC, Charlottesville, Va.), Dec. 28, 2009; Bob Van 
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ers using arbitration clauses declined from 17.4% on December 31, 
2009, to 15.0% on December 31, 2010. 56 More dramatically, the per-
centage of credit card loans subject to arbitration clauses declined 
from 95.1% to only 48.0%. 57 In the aggregate, eight fewer issuers 
used arbitration clauses at the end of 2010 than at the end of 2009. 
Ten issuers switched away from arbitration (including the four set-
tling issuers), while two switched to arbitration. 58 
Voris, HSBC Settles Suit over Arbitration, BosTON GLOBE, jan. 5, 2010, at B10; Maria As pan, ]PMor-
gan Chase to Scrap Arbitration, CAROLINE (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http:/ /www.paymentssource.com/news/jpmorgan-chase-scrap-arbitration-2 709661-1.html. 
56. The sample used in preparing Table I does not include thirty-nine issuers for which 
no agreements as of December 31, 2009, were available, and two issuers for which such agree-
ments were not available by our cut-off date for collecting that data. See Drahozal & Rutledge, 
Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, supra note 23, at 552 n. 76. Of the 334 issuers for 
which we have credit card agreements as of December 31, 2010, 49 (14.7%) of the agreements 
included arbitration clauses, while 285 (or 85.3%) did not. Out of the total credit card loans out-
standing for those 334 issuers, 47.8% were subject to arbitration clauses as of December 31, 
2010, and 52.2% were not. 
57. In july 2010, the Pew Health Group reported finding a "dramatic drop in arbitration 
clauses" in credit card agreements: "In March 2010, only 10 percent of bank cards indicated a 
cardholder was subject to arbitration ... down from 68 percent in 2009." THE PEW HEALTH 
GROUP, TWO STEPS FORWARD: AFTER THE CREDIT CARD ACT, CREDIT CARDS ARE SAFER AND 
MORE TRANSPARENT-BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 19 (2010), available at http://www. 
pewtrusts.org/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Credit _Cards/PEW-
CreditCard%20FINAL.PDF?n=1231 [hereinafter PEW HEALTH GROUP (2010)]. As of May 2011, 
the percentage of bank cards reported by the Pew Health Group as subject to arbitration clauses 
was 14%, still well below the percentages we find. THE PEW HEALTH GROUP, A NEW 
EQUILIBRIUM: AFTER PASSAGE OF LANDMARK CREDIT CARD REFORM, INTERSTATE RATES AND FEES 
HAVE STABILIZED 2 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrusts 
org/Reports/Credit_ Cards/Report_ Equilibrium_ web. pdf. The difference results from the fact 
that the Pew Health Group collects its data from the disclosure documents available on issuer 
web pages, not the cardholder agreements themselves. PEW HEALTH GROUP (2010), supra, at 32 
("Data in this report is based on an analysis of application disclosures provided by credit card 
issuers at the time a consumer applies for a credit card."). Not all issuers disclose the use of ar-
bitration clauses in their disclosure documents; as a result, the Pew Health Group numbers un-
derstate the extent of arbitration clause use. Compare CARD AGREEMENT, CITICRJ PLATINUM 
SELECT®/AADVANTAGE@ VISA SIGNATURE(R) CARD 9-13, available at https:// 
www.citicards.com/cards/acq/cma View.do?PID= 204&cma= true&locale =en_ US (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2013) (including arbitration clause), with CITI DISCLOSURES, ClTI(R) PLATINUM 
SELECT®/AADVANTAGE@ VISA SIGNATURE:&: CARD, available at http://bit.ly/TUAEPj (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2013) (not mentioning arbitration clause). 
Using the same sample of twelve bank issuers as the Pew Health Group, we find that as of 
December 31, 2010, 58.3% of the issuers (seven of twelve) used arbitration clauses and 49.5% 
of the credit card loans outstanding for those issuers were subject to arbitration clauses. 
58. One of the issuers that we classified as switching to arbitration had submitted multi-
ple agreements to the Federal Reserve as of December 31, 2009, one of which included an arbi-
tration clause and the rest of which did not. Because the majority of the clauses submitted for 
2009 did not include arbitration clauses, we classified the issuer as not using arbitration. By 
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2. Carve-outs 
Parties do not always agree to arbitrate all disputes that arise 
under their contract. Even if the contract includes a broad arbitration 
clause, the parties may agree to exclude, or "carve-out," certain 
claims from arbitration. 59 Some courts are skeptical of carve-outs, 
which might permit one party to bring its claims in court while re-
quiring the other party to arbitrate its claims. The California Su-
preme Court, for example, has held that nonmutual carve-outs are 
unconscionable, unless the business can show a "reasonable justifi-
cation" for the nonmutual provision-"i.e., a justification grounded 
in something other than the [business's] desire to maximize its ad-
vantage based on the perceived superiority of the judicial forum." 60 
In some industries, carve-outs are common. Over half of the ar-
bitration clauses in a sample of franchise agreements, for example, 
included multiple carve-outs, such as for trademark disputes, interim 
measures, or injunctive relief. 61 In credit card agreements, carve-outs 
are somewhat less common. 62 
Far and away the most common carve-out in credit card arbitra-
tion clauses is for small claims (defined either by the dollar amount 
sought or by the claims being brought in small claims court). Of the 
issuers studied, thirty-two (of forty-seven, or 68.1 %) excluded small 
claims from arbitration. Most of the agreements that did not exclude 
small claims were from small issuers (the fifteen issuers not includ-
comparison, all of the clauses submitted by the issuer for 2010 included arbitration clauses. 
59. See, e.g., Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 35, at 113-14. 
60. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000); see 
Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) 
("The only business justification offered by Fastbucks for the non-mutual judicial remedy pro-
vision was its need to seek provisional remedies, which is insufficient under California law to 
justify non-mutuality (because California law protects parties' rights to seek provisional reme-
dies in court regardless of any arbitration clause that may cover the parties' dispute)."); Fitz v. 
NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 105 (Ct. App. 2004) ("NCR's concern that arbitration may not 
always meet its legitimate dispute resolution needs is not a proper business justification for the 
exception."); Mercuro v. Superior Court., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 677-78 (Ct. App. 2002) (reject-
ing asserted business justification for carve-out of claims for injunctive relief); see also Christo-
pher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27]. CORP. L. 537, 552-55 (2002) (discuss-
ing business justifications for carve-outs); O'Hara O'Connor et al., supra note 35. 
61. E.g., Drahozal & Wittrock, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 35, at 113-14. 
62. As an extreme example, one (but only one) small issuer in our sample (of forty-seven, 
or 2.1 %; 0.0% of credit card loans outstanding) gave itself the option to arbitrate while requiring 
the cardholder to arbitrate. Typically, however, carve-outs are more narrowly tailored to exclude 
only certain types of claims from arbitration. 
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ing a small claims carve-out comprised only 1.6% of credit card loans 
outstanding, while the thirty-two including a small claims carve-out 
comprised 98.4% of credit card loans outstanding). 
The form of the exclusion varied. As Table 2 shows, the most 
common type of carve-out (twenty-one of forty-seven, or 44.7% of 
issuers; 65.6% of credit card loans outstanding) excluded both issuer 
and consumer claims in small claims court from arbitration. A small-
er group (seven of forty-seven, or 14.9% of issuers; 31.5% of credit 
card loans outstanding) limited the exclusion to consumer claims. 63 
The remaining four carve-outs (8.5% of issuers; less than 1.5% of 
credit card loans outstanding) used dollar cut-offs (ranging from 
$5,000 to $25,000) and usually applied to both consumer and issuer 
claims. 
Table 2. Small Claims Carve-Outs (2010) 
Number of o/o of credit Type of Provision Clauses card loans 
outstanding 
Cardholder small claims 7 31.5% (14.9%) 
Issuer and cardholder small claims 21 65.6% (44.7%) 
Under $5000; issuer and cardholder 1 0.0% (2.1%) 
Under $7500; issuer and cardholder 1 0.0% (2.1%) 
Under $15,000; issuer and cardholder 1 0.1% (2.1%) 
Under $25,000; issuer and cardholder 1 1.2% (2.1%) 
No provision 15 1.6% (31.9%) 
Relatedly, five issuers (of forty-seven, or 10.6%; but 51.4% of 
credit card loans outstanding) excluded debt collection claims from 
arbitration. (Four of the five also excluded issuer and cardholder 
small claims cases from arbitration.) One clause (of forty-seven, or 
63. If claims brought by issuers in small claims court are excluded from arbitration, a 
small claims exclusion may permit issuers to avoid arbitration for many of its claims. Drahozal 
& Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, supra note 23, at 545 n.48. 
22 
1 Contract and Choice 
2.1 %; 0.0% of credit card loans outstanding) by a very small issuer 
sought to obtain a similar result by expressly providing that the issu-
er's filing of a debt collection action does not waive its right to de-
mand arbitration in the event the cardholder files a counterclaim.64 
Whether a court would honor such a no-waiver provision is uncer-
tain. 
Other types of carve-outs are less common in credit card arbitra-
tion clauses. Nine issuers (of forty-seven, or 19.1%; 3.8% of credit 
card loans outstanding) excluded from arbitration claims for interim 
relief, such as preliminary injunctions and attachments. Twelve issu-
ers (of forty-seven, or 25.5%; 11.2% of credit card loans outstand-
ing) excluded repossession and other self-help remedies, while six 
issuers (of forty-seven, or 12.8%; 3.6% of credit card loans outstand-
ing) excluded claims in bankruptcy. 
3. Opt-out provisions 
Some courts consider whether cardholders have the ability to opt 
out of an arbitration clause in deciding whether the clause is proce-
durally unconscionable.65 As can be seen in Table 3, most arbitration 
agreements in our sample (thirty-five of forty-seven, or 74.5% of is-
suers; 76.3% of credit card loans outstanding) do not include an opt-
out provision.66 For those that do, the amount of time in which the 
64. lberiabank, Cardholder Credit Card Agreement and Additional Disclosures (Dec. 31, 
2010) (copy on file with authors): 
I d. 
No Waiver: You and we agree that bringing a lawsuit, counterclaim, or other action in 
court shall not be deemed a waiver of the right to demand arbitration of any Dispute 
brought by the other party. As an example, and not by way of limitation, if we file a 
lawsuit against you in court to collect a debt and you file a counterclaim against us in 
that lawsuit, we have the right to demand that the entire Dispute, including our orig-
inal lawsuit against you and your counterclaim against us, be arbitrated in accordance 
with this arbitration provision. 
65. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Hoffman v. Citibank 
(S.D.), N.A., 546 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding for district court to determine 
whether cardholder had meaningful ability to opt out of arbitration clause and requiring the 
court to consider "issues such as how much additional time the expiration date cutoff typically 
provides, how many customers exercise their ability to opt out and whether other banks use 
similar provisions"). But see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Man tor, 335 F.3d I 101, 1106 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding employee had no "meaningful opportunity to opt-out of the arbitration program" 
when "management impliedly and expressly pressured [the employee] not to opt-out"). 
66. Of those that do, the clause in the Discover Bank cardholder agreement is illustrative: 
You may reject the Arbitration of Disputes section but only if we receive from you a 
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cardholder can exercise the right to opt out varies from thirty days 
(the most common-seven of forty-seven, or 14.9% of issuers; 
17.4% of credit card loans outstanding) to sixty days (four of forty-
seven, or 8.5% of issuers; 6.2% of credit card loans outstanding). 
Table 3. Cardholder Agreements Permitting Opt Out of Arbitration 
(2010) 
Number of %of credit 
card loans out-Clauses 
standing 
Right to Opt Out- within 30 days 7 17.4% (14.9%) 
Right to Opt Out -within 45 days 1 0.2% (2.1 %) 
Right to Opt Out - within 60 days 4 6.2% (8.5%) 
No Right to Opt Out 35 76.3% (74.5%) 
C. Provisions of Arbitration Clauses 
By agreeing to arbitration, parties agree to a form of dispute 
resolution that differs from litigation in court. Parties retain the abil-
ity to customize the arbitration process to a large degree, as dis-
cussed more in this and following sections. But even if the parties do 
not customize the process, arbitration still differs in important ways 
from court: juries are not available, 67 discovery tends to be more lim-
written notice of rejection within 30 days of your receipt of the Card. You must send 
the notice of rejection to: Discover, PO Box 30938, Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0938. 
Your rejection notice must include your name, address, phone number, Account 
number and personal signature. No one else may sign the rejection notice for you. 
Your rejection notice also must not be sent with any other correspondence. However, 
if you previously had the chance to reject an arbitration agreement with us but did 
not, you may not reject it now. Rejection of arbitration will not affect your other 
rights or responsibilities under this Agreement or your obligation to arbitrate dis-
putes under any other account as to which you and we have agreed to arbitrate dis-
putes. If you once sent us a rejection notice on a different account or card, you must 
send us a new rejection notice or else this arbitration agreement will apply to any dis-
putes with us relating to your other accounts or cards. 
DISCOVER BANK, CAROM EMBER AGREEMENT 5 (Dec. 31, 201 0) (copy on file with authors). 
67. See. e.g., jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Con-
cerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. I, 5 (1997). 
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ited, 68 and courts do not review awards on the merits but rather only 
on the limited grounds set out in the governing arbitration statute. 69 
Many of the clauses in the sample gave cardholders notice (al-
most always in capital letters and bold type) of those differences. All 
but two of the clauses (forty-five of forty-seven, or 95. 7%; 99.9% of 
credit card loans outstanding) notified cardholders that blo agreeing 
to arbitration they were giving up any right to a jury trial. 0 The ma-
jority of the clauses also notified cardholders that both the availabil-
ity of discovery (twenty-eight of forty-seven, or 60.0%; 41.6% of 
credit card loans outstanding) and the right to appeal (twenty-nine 
of forty-seven, or 61. 7%; 53.5% of credit card loans outstanding) 
were more limited in arbitration than in court. (An additional five 
clauses (of forty-seven, or 10.6%; but 38.8% of credit card loans out-
standing) provided notice that the procedures in arbitration were 
simpler and more limited than in court, without being specific as to 
what those procedures were.) Finally, forty-three clauses (of forty-
seven, or 91.5%; but 99.9% of credit card loans outstanding) in-
formed cardholders that they could not be a party to a class action in 
court if the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause. 
Parties to an arbitration agreement may modify these typical 
characteristics of arbitration or otherwise define the arbitration pro-
cess in their arbitration clause. The rest of this section examines the 
extent to which credit card agreements in our sample contain provi-
sions that (l) set out the governing arbitration law, (2) select a pro-
vider to administer the arbitration, (3) delegate certain decisions to 
the arbitrators, ( 4) provide a minimum recovery to a prevailing card-
68. See, e.g .. 3 MACNEIL, supra note 3, § 34.1 at 34:2 ("Limitations on discovery ... re-
main one of the hallmarks of American commercial arbitration, including arbitration under the 
FAA. Avoidance of the del.1y and expense associated with discovery is still one of the reasons 
parties choose to arbitrate.") (footnotes omitted). 
69. Sec 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). Courts are split on whether manifest disregard of the law, 
which provides a very slight degree of merits review for arbitration awards, remains avallable as 
a ground for vacating an award. Kulchinsky v. Ameriprise Fin., No. 11-0319, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXlS 75917, at *19 n.8 (E. D. Pa. july 14, 2011) (noting that "Courts of Appeals are presently 
divided on the issue"). For rhe leading cases, see Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 
1324 (llth Cir. 2010); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355-56, 358 (5th 
Cir. 2009); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Jmprov W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009); Stolt-
Nielsen SA v. AnimaiFeeds lnt'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-95 (2d Cir. 2008); Coffee Beanery. Ltd. 
v. WW, L.L.C., No. 08-1830, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23645, at *4 (6th Cir. 2008). 
70. One other clause (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 0.1% of credit card loans outstanding) in-
formed parties generally that they were waiving their right to litigate in court, without being 
more specific. 
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holder, (5) contain possibly "unfair" provisions, ( 6) regulate the 
costs of arbitration, and (7) establish an arbitral appeals panel or ad-
dress the scope of court review of awards. 
1. Governing arbitration law 
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
junior University, the Supreme Court held that parties can incorporate 
state arbitration law by reference into their contract, even if the pro-
vision of state arbitration law otherwise would be preempted by the 
FAA. 71 If the parties so agree, the provisions of the state arbitration 
law are treated as part of the arbitration agreement and are to be en-
forced as such by courts under the FAA. 
So understood, this aspect of Volt is unexceptional. To illustrate, 
under well-settled FAA preemption principles, a state law that pre-
cludes arbitrators from resolving claims under a particular state stat-
ute (such as a franchisee protection statute) would be preempted. 72 
But the FAA certainly does not preclude the parties themselves from 
agreeing to exclude claims under the state franchisee protection 
statute from their arbitration agreement. Thus, if the parties' agree-
ment incorporates by reference state arbitration law to define its 
scope, then courts will enforce the agreement so construed. 
The more difficult issue is deciding when the parties have agreed 
to incorporate state arbitration law by reference into their agree-
ment. In Volt, the Supreme Court did not decide that issue; instead 
the Court deferred to the California court's interpretation of a gen-
eral choice-of-law clause in the contract as constituting the parties' 
agreement to state arbitration law. 73 Following Volt, numerous lower 
courts construed general choice-of-law clauses as incorporating state 
arbitration law?4 Given how frequently parties include choice-of-law 
71. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989) ("Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing 
those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, 
even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go for-
ward."). 
72. E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. l, 10 (1984). 
73. 489 U.S. at 474 ("Appellant acknowledges, as it must, that the interpretation of pri-
vate contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review."). 
The Supreme Court did decide that, on the facts of the case, the FAA did not preempt the state 
court's interpretation. I d. at 468. 
74. E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 7I 7 (7th Cir. 
!994), rev'd, 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
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clauses in their contracts, the result was to restrict the scope of FAA 
preemption substantially. In subsequent cases, however, the Su-
preme Court rejected that interpretation of a general choice-of-law 
clause. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Court re-
fused to construe a general choice-of-law clause (which specified 
New York law as the governing law) as "mean[ing] 'New York deci-
sional law, including that State's allocation of power between courts 
and arbitrators, notwithstanding otherwise-applicable federal 
law."'75 Instead, as reiterated in Preston v. Ferrer, "the 'best way to 
harmonize' the parties' adoption of the AAA rules and their selection 
of [state] law is to read the latter to encompass prescriptions govern-
ing the substantive rights and obligations of the parties, but not the 
State's 'special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators."'76 
Data from the credit card agreements we studied, as shown in 
Table 4, are consistent with the view reflected in Mastrobuono and 
Preston that parties do not ordinarily intend to incorporate state arbi-
tration law, to the exclusion of federal arbitration law, into their ar-
bitration agreements. Only one very small issuer (of forty-seven, or 
2.1 %; 0.0% of credit card loans outstanding) in our sample contract-
ed solely for application of a state's arbitration law to the arbitration 
proceeding. By contrast, forty-three issuers (of forty-seven, or 91.5%; 
99.9% of credit card loans outstanding) specified that the FAA ap-
plies, ordinarily with either no mention of state law or expressly ex-
cluding the application of state arbitration law. 77 
Presumably the provisions specifying the governing arbitration 
law were included in response to Volt to make clear that parties were 
not trying to incorporate state arbitration law by reference. Such a 
wholesale rejection strongly suggests that, at least for credit card is-
suers, the contract interpretation in Mastrobuono and Preston is more 
in accord with the parties' agreement. 
75. 514 u.s. 52,60 (1995). 
76. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63-64). 
77. The other three issuers, also very small, had no provision on the applicable arbitration 
law in their arbitration clause. 
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Table 4. Governing Arbitration Law (2010) 
Type of Provision Number of Clauses %of credit card loans outstanding 
FAA 28 75.9% (59.6%) 
FAA and not state law 8 7.0% (17.0%) 
FAA and state law if 6 11.6% 
applicable (12.8%) 
FAA and state law 1 5.3% (2.1%) 
State law 1 0.0% (2.1 %) 
No provision 3 0.1% (6.4%) 
2. Provider rules 
All of the arbitration clauses in the sample provide for adminis-
tered arbitration-that is, arbitration in which an arbitration provid-
er handles the administrative aspects of the case, makes available de-
tailed rules governing the proceeding, and serves as an appointing 
authority if the parties cannot otherwise agree on an arbitrator. The 
arbitration rules promulgated by providers, which the parties incor-
porate into their arbitration agreement, also modify the default char-
acteristics of arbitration. 78 
Table 5 lists the arbitration providers specified in the arbitration 
clauses in our sample as of December 31, 2009 and 201 0?9 The AAA 
78. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL L. REV. 695, 
728-31; Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 
79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 310-15 (2012) (describing provisions of AAA Consumer Due Process Pro-
tocol); supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
79. In reporting the arbitration providers specified in credit card arbitration agreements 
as of December 31, 2009, Drahozal and Rutledge used a broader sample of issuers from the Fed-
eral Reserve web page, which both (I) included issuers that did not file call reports with federal 
banking regulators, and (2) did not consolidate related entities. Drahozal & Rutledge, Contract 
and Procedure, supra note 23, at 1126 tbl.3. Even so, the results are broadly consistent with those 
reported here using a narrower sample. As noted previously, the sample of issuers included in 
Table 5 arc those issuers that included arbitration clauses as of both December 31, 2009, and 
December 31, 2010. If the sample instead is expanded to all issuers with arbitration clauses as of 
December 31, 2010, the choice of arbitration providers is as follows: AAA or JAMS (fifteen 
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is named as the exclusive provider in sixteen (of thirty-nine, or 
41.0%; 16.3% of credit card loans outstanding) of the arbitration 
clauses as of December 31,2010, and is listed as one of two or three 
permissible providers in an additional sixteen (of thirty-nine, or 
41.0%; 82.3% of credit card loans outstanding). 80 Two clauses (of 
thirty-nine, or 5.1 %; 0.1% of credit card loans outstanding) name 
JAMS as the exclusive provider, and another seventeen (of thirty-
nine, or 43.6%; 82.3% of credit card loans outstanding) list it as one 
of two or three permissible providers. Two (of thirty-nine, or 5.1 %; 
0.1% of credit card loans outstanding) continue to name the Nation-
al Arbitration Forum as the exclusive provider, despite the fact that 
it no longer administers consumer arbitrations.81 One clause (of 
thirty-nine, or 2.6%; 0.0% of credit card loans outstanding) gives the 
parties a choice between JAMS and National Arbitration and Media-
tion, 82 a less well-known provider, and another clause (one of thirty-
nine, or 2.6%; 1.2% of credit card loans outstanding) specifies only 
that the provider shall be "a national arbitration organization with 
significant experience in financial and consumer disputes."83 
clauses, 81.7% of credit card loans outstanding); AAA, NAF, JAMS (two clauses; 0.5%); AAA 
(twenty-one clauses, 16.3%); AAA or NAF (one clause, 0.0%); JAMS (two clauses, 0.1 %); JAMS 
or NAF (one clause, 0.0%); JAMS or NAMS (I clause, 0.0%); NAF (three clauses, 0.1 %); ana-
tional organization with significant experience in consumer and financial disputes (one clause, 
1.2%). 
80. Two small issuers incorporated the AAA rules into their arbitration clause but did not 
specify the AAA itself as the provider. Although we classified these issuers as choosing the AAA, 
their arbitration clauses might be construed as not specifying any provider. 
81. The unavailability of the NAF raises serious questions about the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement that lists only the NAF to administer the arbitration. Courts currently are 
split on whether the use of NAF is integral to the arbitration agreement such that its unavaila-
bility makes the arbitration clause as a whole unenforceable. Compare Jones v. GGNSC Pierre 
LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (O.S.D. 2010) ("Under all of the circumstances, the Court 
finds no reason to believe the specification of the NAF rules was integral to the Arbitration 
Agreement. Thus, the Court finds that Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes and 
requires the Court to appoint an arbitrator."), Levy v. Cain, Watters & Assocs., No. 2:09-cv-723, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2010) (same), and Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 
08-cv-13170, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112204, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (same), with 
Ranzy v. Tijerina, No. 10-20251, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17872, at **4-5 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2010) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding that because designation of NAF as the sole arbitration forum 
"is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, ... a federal court need not compel arbitra-
tion in a substitute forum if the designated forum becomes unavailable"), Carideo v. Dell, Inc., 
No. C06-1772JLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104600, at *18 (W.O. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009) (same), 
and Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327, 336-37 (111. 2011) (same). 
82. See NATIONAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION, http:/ /www.namadr.com (last visited July 
28, 2011). 
83. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OMAHA, CARDMEMBER AGREEMENT 11 (Dec. 31, 2010) (copy 
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The data illustrate how credit card issuers responded to the Na-
tional Arbitration Forum's decision to cease all administration of 
new consumer arbitrations in July 2009.84 A number of large issuers 
(reflecting 47.6% of credit card loans outstanding and subject to ar-
bitration in the sample) still specified the NAF as a possible provider 
in the credit card agreements they filed with the Federal Reserve as 
of December 31, 2009.85 By December 31, 2010, all of those issuers 
(with the exception of one very small issuer) had replaced the NAF 
with JAMS as an approved provider. Even a year and a half after the 
NAF's decision, a surprising number of issuers continued to include 
the NAF in their arbitration clauses. When the NAF is listed as one 
of multiple providers, the risks of not updating the arbitration clause 
are limited because another provider continues to be available. The 
persistence of the NAF in some credit card arbitration agreements 
for at least a year and a half after it was no longer available suggests 
that the costs of updating the issuer's arbitration clauses exceed the 
benefits, or that the provision for some other reason is "sticky."86 
on file with authors). 
84. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
85. This figure understates the market share of NAF before july 2009, as all four of the 
issuers (Bank of America, Capital One, Chase, and HSBC) that settled the antitrust claims 
against them-by removing arbitration clauses from their credit card agreements for a period of 
years-listed the National Arbitration Forum as a provider in their arbitration clauses before the 
Settlement. See First Amended Class Action Complaint para. 121, Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
No. 05-cv-7116 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2009), available at http://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/ 
documents/files/2009-06-04-1 st-amended-complain t. pdf. 
86. E.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in 
Consumer Standard Form Contracts, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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Table 5. Choice of Provider (2009 & 2010) 
Contracts as of 12/31/09 Contracts as of 12/31/10 
Number o/o of credit Number o/o of credit 
Provider(s) of Claus- card loans of Claus- card loans 
es outstanding es outstanding 
AAAorJAMS 8 30.6% 13 81.8% (20.5%) (33.3%) 
AAA, NAF, 3 0.5% 2 0.5% JAMS (7.7%) (5.1%) 
AAA 15 20.3% 16 16.3% (38.5%) (41.0%) 
AAAorNAF 6 47.6% 1 0.0% (15.4%) (2.6%) 
JAMS 1 0.1 o/o 2 0.1 o/o (2.6%) (5.1 %) 
JAMS or NAF 1 0.0% 1 0.0% (2.6%) (2.6%) 
JAMS or 1 0.0% 1 0.0% NAMS (2.6%) (2.6%) 
NAF 4 0.8% 2 0.1 o/o (10.3%) (5.1%) 
Nat'l org. w/ 
significant 
experience in 1 1.2% 
consumer & (2.6%) 
financial dis-
putes 
Finally, only one arbitration clause in the sample expressly re-
ferred to the Consumer Due Process Protocol-a set of privately de-
veloped fairness standards used by the AAA in administering con-
sumer arbitrations. 87 (None referred to the JAMS Minimum 
Standards of Procedural Fairness.) 88 That clause stated: 
87. NAT'L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 
(1998), available at http:/ /adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG _ 005014. 
88. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE 
CLAUSES MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009) [hereinafter JAMS, MINIMUM 
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS], available at http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-
arbitration. 
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This Provision is Drafted with intent to provide a "fair" alternative 
to the judicial system and its risks. This is not drafted in the same 
anti-consumer fashion as many bank and financial entity provisions 
that have been attacked as burdensome and overzealous by "advo-
cates" such as Remar Sutton. The terms have been prepared in gen-
eral accord with the equitable principles set forth in the "Consumer 
Due Process Protocol" of the American Arbitration Association. 89 
To the extent the clauses choose the AAA or JAMS as a provider, 
any arbitrations under the clauses are subject to the Consumer Due 
Process Protocol or the JAMS Minimum Standards of Procedural 
Fairness regardless of whether the clause expressly incorporates 
those standards.90 
And, as the discussion that follows suggests, the substantial ma-
jority of the clauses we studied appear to comply with those stand-
ards.91 
3. Delegation clauses 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.jackson, the Supreme Court held that 
parties can agree by contract to delegate to the arbitrators the exclu-
sive authority to rule on unconscionability challenges to the arbitra-
tion clause.9 The so-called "delegation clause" in Rent-A-Center pro-
vided: 
[T]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agen-
cy, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to 
the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this 
Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any 
part of this Agreement is void or voidable. 93 
89. South Carolina Federal Credit Union, Credit Card Agreement and Disclosures para. 
34 (Sept. 30, 2010) (copy on file with authors). 
90. See AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, RULES UPDATES, CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS: NOTICE TO 
CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES 8 (2007) (copy on file with author); JAMS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, supra note 88, at 2 ("JAMS will administer arbitrations pursuant to man-
datory pre-dispute arbitration clauses between companies and consumers only if the contract 
arbitration clause and specified applicable rules comply with the following minimum standards 
of fairness."). 
91. Compare infra Tables 7-9, with Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 78, at 320-21. 
92. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010). 
93. Id. at 2775. 
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In the absence of such a delegation clause, an unconscionability 
challenge to the arbitration clause would be one on which courts 
would have the final say. 94 
Commentators predicted that after Rent-A-Center, businesses 
would likely revise their consumer and employment arbitration 
clauses to include delegation clauses.95 If so, courts would lose their 
ability to police arbitration clauses on unconscionability grounds, 
unless the court first held the delegation clause unenforceable. 96 
And to do so, challenges to that clause must be directed specifically 
to that clause, not the contract as a whole or the arbitration clause as 
a whole. 97 Our data provide an early look at whether credit card is-
suers have revised their arbitration clauses to include delegation 
clauses. 
94. Jd. at 2778. 
95. See, e.g., jean R. Sternlight, The Role of Courts in Interpreting and Enforcing Arbitration 
Clauses: A Process Viewed Through Two Different Lenses 4-5 (20 11) (paper prepared for conference on 
"The Future of Arbitration" (Mar. 17-18, 2011)), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/ 
2010-2011Events/Documents/Sternlight%20Submission.pdf ("It seems quite likely that in light 
of Rent-a-Center many companies will now draft clauses largely delegating to the arbitrator the 
question of whether the arbitration clause is enforceable .... Thus, it would not be surprising 
to see companies draft clauses in the mandatory arbitration context that require courts to deter-
mine the availability of class claims, and whether a class action prohibition is unconscionable, 
but require arbitrators to decide all other issues pertaining to the validity of arbitration clauses."). 
96. Courts since Rent-A-Center are split on whether delegation clauses in consumer and 
employment contracts are unconscionable. See Howard v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-103, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76342, at *15 (E. D. Tenn. july 28, 2010) (holding that "allowing arbitra-
tors [to] determine their own jurisdiction is neither contrary to ... public policy nor uncon-
scionable"); Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 554 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (asserting that "[t]here is substantial authority that a delegation clause in an adhe-
sion contract is unconscionable," but refusing to invalidate clause because franchisee "makes no 
colorable claim that any other term of the arbitration provision is unconscionable"); see also On-
tiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 480-81 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that 
"the provision in the arbitration agreement giving the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide 
enforceability issues is unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable," because when "one party 
tends to be a repeat player, the arbitrator has a unique self-interest in deciding that a dispute is 
arbitrable"); Murphy v. Check 'N Go of Cal., Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 120, 125 (Ct. App. 2007) 
("[I]n this contract of adhesion, the provision for arbitrator determinations of unconscionability 
is unenforceable. Under the circumstances of this case, the judge is the proper gatekeeper to 
determine unconscionability."). 
97. The one exception is for the question whether the parties assented to the arbitration 
agreement. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 n.2 ("The issue of the agreement's 'validity' is 
different from the issue whether any agreement between the parties 'was ever concluded,' and, 
as in Buckeye Check Cashing, Tnc. v. Cardegna we address only the former."). 
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None of the arbitration clauses in our sample included the sort 
of definitive language ("The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or 
local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to re-
solve .... ") that is in the Rent-A-Center arbitration clause. That 
said, the majority of the clauses in the sample, both before and after 
Rent-A-Center, do state that the arbitrators have the authority to rule 
on the validity of the arbitration agreement, which courts treat as 
comparable to the language in Rent-A-Center.98 So defined, as of De-
cember 31, 2010, twenty (of thirty-nine, or 51.3%) clauses included 
a delegation clause; and 52.6% of credit card loans outstanding in 
the sample were subject to a delegation clause. 99 
Although not as common as delegation clauses, twelve (of thirty-
nine, or 30.8%; 12.8% of credit card loans outstanding) arbitration 
clauses included a delegation clause that excludes issues of class ar-
bitration from the scope of the clause. In other words, the clauses 
provided that arbitrators are to decide issues of the validity of the ar-
bitration clause, except for issues related to class arbitration, which 
are to be decided by courts. Such clauses likely reflect an attempt to 
avoid the empirical reality that (at least before the Supreme Court's 
decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.) 100 AAA 
arbitrators almost unanimously construed arbitration clauses as 
98. Because none of the delegation clauses in our sample is as definitively worded as the 
clause in Rent-A-Center, our classifications of those clauses are broad. A court that construed 
these clauses narrowly might find that they did not fall under the holding in Rent-A-Center. To 
date, however, most courts construe language such as that in the clauses we studied as falling 
under Rent-A-Center, and we follow those decisions in our coding. See, e.g., Momot v. Mastro, 652 
F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that language in arbitration agreement providing that 
parties agree to arbitrate any dispute that "'arises out of or relates to ... the validity or appli-
cation of any of the provisions of this Section 4' ... constitutes 'an agreement to arbitrate 
threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement"' under Rent-A-Center). 
99. In reporting the use of delegation clauses in credit card arbitration agreements as of 
December 31, 2009, Drahozal & Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, supra note 23, at 1123 tb1.2, 
used a broader sample of issuers from the Federal Reserve web page, which both (1) included 
issuers that did not file call reports with federal banking regulators and (2) did not consolidate 
related entities. Even so, the results are broadly consistent with those reported here. 
As noted previously, the sample of issuers included in Table 6 are those issuers that in-
cluded arbitration clauses as of both December 31, 2009, and December 31, 2010. If the sample 
instead is expanded to all issuers with arbitration clauses as of December 31, 2010, the use of 
delegation clauses is as follows: anti-delegation (four of forty-seven (8.5%) clauses; 29.1% of 
credit card loans outstanding); class exception (fifteen of forty-seven (31.9%) clauses; 12.8% of 
credit card loans outstanding); delegation (twenty-four of forty-seven (51.1 %) clauses; 52.7% of 
credit card loans outstanding); and none (four of forty-seven (8.5%) clauses, 5.4% of credit card 
loans outstanding). 
100. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds lnt'l,l30 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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permitting class arbitration, even though almost no clauses expressly 
permit arbitration on a class basis. 101 
Table 6. Dele ation Clauses (2009 & 2010) 
Contracts as of 12/31/09 Contracts as of 12/31/10 
Type of Number %of credit Number %of credit 
of Claus- card loans card loans Clause of Clauses 
es outstanding outstanding 
Anti- 3 12.5% 4 29.2% Delegation (7.7%) (10.3%) 
Class Ex- 11 26.5% 12 12.8% 
ception (38.2%) (30.8%) 
Delegation 22 60.8% 20 52.6% (56.4%) (51.3%) 
None 3 0.2% 3 5.4% (7.7%) (7.7%) 
Four issuers (out of thirty-nine, or 10.3%; but 29.2% of credit 
card loans outstanding) used an anti-delegation clause-expressly 
providing that the validity of the arbitration agreement may be re-
solved only in court and not in arbitration. Finally, three of the 
clauses included no provision on point. But all three issuers did in-
corporate provider rules-which give arbitrators authority to rule on 
the validity of the arbitration clause-into their arbitration clauses. 
Given that most courts construe such provider rules as falling under 
Rent-A-Center, 102 these clauses effectively include delegation clauses, 
although not by express language. 103 
Interestingly, though, the use of delegation clauses declined 
slightly, and the use of anti-delegation clauses actually increased af-
ter Rent-A-Center. Between 2009 and 2010, two issuers added a class 
101. Drahozal & Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, supra note 23, at 1141, 1157-58 (noting 
that AAA arbitrators continue to construe arbitration clauses to permit class arbitration, alt-
hough at a lower rate following Stolt-Nielsen). 
102. See Falla v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2009); Awuah v. Cover-
all N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, l 0-12 (1st Cir. 2009); Terminix Int'l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. 
P'ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1331-32 (lith Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 
F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 
!994); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 472-73 (1st Cir. 1989). But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION§ 4-14 cmt. e & report-
er's note e (Tentative Draft No.2, 2012). 
I 03. For the other arbitration clauses in our sample, the language in the clauses (including 
anti-delegation and class-exception clauses) will control over the language in the provider rules. 
35 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
exception to their arbitration clauses, and one (relatively large) issu-
er replaced its class exception with an anti-delegation clause. 104 No 
issuers in our sample added delegation clauses to their arbitration 
clauses after Rent-A-Center. 
Again, these are early results. The Supreme Court issued the 
Rent-A-Center decision on June 21, 2010, just six months prior to the 
December 31, 2010, filings we consider in this study. Given the slow 
speed of issuer response to the NAF's demise as a provider of con-
sumer arbitration services, 105 it may be too early to conclude that 
credit card issuers will not respond to Rent-A-Center by including del-
egation clauses in their arbitration clauses. So far, however, we find 
no such trend. 
4. Minimum recovery provisions 
The arbitration clause in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion provided 
that a consumer who recovered more in arbitration than AT&T's last 
settlement offer would recover a minimum of $7500 and double at-
torney's fees. 106 The district court in that case found that "[b]ecause 
the arbitration provision provides sufficient incentive for individual 
consumers with disputes involving small damages to pursue (a) the 
informal claims process to redress their grievances, and (b) arbitra-
tion in the event of an unresolved claim, the subject provision is an 
adequate substitute for class arbitration." 107 The Supreme Court 
likewise referred to the provision in its opinion, characterizing the 
district court's decision as finding that "the Concepcions were better 
104. One issuer revised its credit card agreement in 2010 to collect all of the definitions in 
one section at the beginning of the agreement. As a result, it moved the definition of "claim" 
from the paragraph entitled "Arbitration" to a paragraph entitled "Definitions." The relevant 
language of the definition of "claim"-which included "the validity, enforceability or scope of 
this provision"-remained the same in the two agreements. But because of the location of the 
clause, instead of "this provision" referring to the arbitration clause (and hence making the pro-
vision a delegation clause), it now refers to the detlnitions section of the agreement (arguably 
making the provision no longer a delegation clause). Compare Fifth Third Bank, Select Card Alli-
ance Agreement 1 (Dec. 3], 2010) (copy on tlle with authors), with Fifth Third Bank, Card 
Agreement for MasterCard® and Visa® para. 25 (Dec. 31, 2009) (copy on tlle with authors). In 
coding the provision, we took the view that the reorganization of the agreement likely was not 
intended to make a substantive change in the terms of the arbitration clause, and so coded it as 
including a delegation clause in both 2009 and 2010. 
105. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
106. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
107. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cvll67 OMS (AJB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103712, at *37 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 
849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
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off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would 
have been as participants in a class action." 108 
Only one clause in our sample (which predated the Supreme 
Court's decision in Concepcion) included a similar provision. The arbi-
tration clause in the World Financial Network National Bank 
(WFNNB) credit card agreement provided for a "special payment" to 
a prevailing cardholder as follows: 
14. Special Payment: If (1) you submit a Claim Notice in accord-
ance with Paragraph 30.B. on your own behalf (and not on behalf of 
any other party); (2) we refuse to provide you with the relief you 
request; and (3) an arbitrator subsequently determines that you 
were entitled to such relief (or greater relief), the arbitrator shall 
award you at least $5,100 (plus any fees and costs to which you are 
entitled).109 
Although the amount of the "special payment" is less than that 
in the AT&T Mobility clause, the structure of the clause is the same: 
if the cardholder asserts a claim that the issuer does not pay, and the 
cardholder then recovers in arbitration at least as much as the 
amount claimed, the issuer will make a minimum payment that 
might exceed the cardholder's actual damages. 110 It remains to be 
seen whether additional issuers will incorporate such a clause into 
their arbitration agreement after Concepcion; our data are not able to 
answer that question. 
5. "Unfair" provisions 
Courts and commentators have identified an array of provisions 
in arbitration clauses as "unfair" to consumers and employees. 111 
108. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
109. World Financial Network National Bank, Trek Bikes Credit Card Agreement f[ 
30.C.14 (Dec. 31, 2010) (copy on file with authors). 
110. We discuss the legal significance of this type of provision infra Part III. 
111. See Michael G. McGuinness & Adam]. Karr, California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitra-
tion: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 2005 ]. O!SP. RESOL. 61, 87-89 (2005) (listing types of provisions held uncon-
scionable by California courts); Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 30, at 638 
(" [T]he arbitration clauses are crucial in that they not only bar judicial relief but also may allow 
companies to select the arbitrators, set the arbitration in a location convenient for the company 
but not for the little guy, exclude certain recoveries such as punitive damages, shorten the stat-
ute of limitations, deny discovery and other procedural protections, and eliminate virtually any 
right to appeal."). But see Drahozal, supra note 78, at 756-64 (arguing that "unfair" provisions 
might make consumers and employees better off or at least are not unambiguously unfair). 
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This section examines the use of some of those provisions in credit 
card agreements.ll 2 The short answer is that, with the exception of 
class arbitration waivers, most of these types of provisions are rare 
or nonexistent in credit card agreements. 
Table 7 lists several types of provisions identified by courts and 
commentators as unfair or at least potentially unfair: clauses result-
ing in biased decision-makers, class-arbitration waivers, remedy limi-
tations (such as waivers of punitive damages), shortened time limits 
for filing claims, distant hearing locations, limits on discovery, provi-
sions precluding the cardholder from disclosing the existence of a 
dispute, and provisions denying a right to counsel or an in-person 
hearing. The list includes many if not most of the provisions most 
frequently challenged as unconscionable; those not included (e.g., 
provisions setting up a nonmutual arbitral appeals process and pro-
visions dealing with arbitral costs) are excluded from this table only 
because of the greater variety of approaches reflected in such clauses 
(but "unfair" variations of those provisions are nonetheless rare). 113 
The only type of provision in this list of "unfair" provisions that 
is common in credit card agreements is a class arbitration waiver, the 
provision at issue in Concepcion. Of the arbitration clauses in the 
sample, forty-four offorty-seven clauses (or 93.6%) (covering 99.9% 
of the credit card loans outstanding) waived any right to class arbi-
tration. Because arbitration clauses themselves preclude a party from 
being a member of a class action in court, 114 the vast majority of ar-
bitration clauses in the sample would preclude cardholders from ob-
taining class relief. 
By comparison, as already stated, the other types of "unfair" pro-
visions in the list almost never appear in the arbitration clauses in 
the sample. None of the clauses in the sample contained a biased ar-
bitrator selection mechanism, specified biasing arbitrator qualifica-
tions, or denied the right to counsel. Only three clauses (of forty-
seven, or 6.4% of clauses; 1.2% of credit card loans outstanding) in-
cluded a limitation on the award of punitive damages. Only one 
clause included a nondisclosure provision, although it covered 5. 7% 
112. Some provisions alleged to be unfair (e.g., delegation clauses and exclusions from 
arbitration) have already been discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64, 92-!05. Oth-
ers (e.g., provisions allocating arbitration costs and providing for arbitral-appeals panels) are 
addressed in later sections. See infra text accompanying notes 119-41. 
113. See infra text accompanying notes 119-41. 
114. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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of credit card loans outstanding. The other provisions listed in Table 
7-time limits for filing claims, potentially distant hearing locations, 
limits on available discovery, and restrictions on the availability of an 
in-person hearing-are included in at most two clauses and apply to 
no more than 0.2% of credit card loans outstanding in the sample. 
Table 7. Selected "Unfair" Provisions (2010) 
Number of %of credit Type of Provision Clauses card loans 
outstanding 
Biased arbitrator selection mecha- 0 0.0% 
nism (0.0%) 
Biasing arbitrator qualifications 0 0.0% (0.0%) 
Class arbitration waiver 44 99.9% (93.6%) 
Remedy limitations 3 1.2% (6.4%) 
Time limits for filing claims 2 0.0% (4.3%) 
Potentially distant location for hear- 2 0.1% ing (4.3%) 
Discovery limits 1 0.2% (2.1 %) 
Denial of right to counsel 0 0.0% (0.0%) 
Nondisclosure provision 1 5.7% (2.1 %) 
Lack of in-person hearing 2 0.0% (4.3%) 
A few other points worth noting about provisions dealing with 
issues related to those listed in Table 7: 
• Twenty-five of the clauses (of forty-seven, or 53.2%; 44.4% 
of credit card loans outstanding) contained no provision re-
quiring particular qualifications for arbitrators. Of the twen-
ty-two clauses that did set out some sort of required qualifi-
cations: one (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 0.0% of credit card 
loans outstanding) required expertise in the subject matter of 
the dispute; one (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 1.2% of credit card 
loans outstanding) required that the arbitrator be a retired 
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federal judge if a party so requests; while the remammg 
twenty (of forty-seven, or 42.6%; 54.4% of credit card loans 
outstanding) required that the arbitrator be either a lawyer 
(with varying degrees of experience) or a retired judge (one 
clause provided that "registered arbitrator" was an option as 
well). 
• Although the substantial majority of arbitration clauses in-
cluded class arbitration waivers, two (of forty-seven, or 4.3%; 
0.1% of credit card loans outstanding) contained no provi-
sion on the issue and one (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 0.0% of 
credit card loans outstanding) was silent on class arbitration 
while expressly authorizing consolidation of related claims. 
• Slightly under half of the clauses (twenty-one of forty-seven, 
or 44. 7%) from issuers with slightly more than half the mar-
ket share (53.6%) contained an "anti-severability provision." 
Such clauses provide that if a court invalidates the class arbi-
tration waiver, the invalid waiver should not be severed from 
the rest of the arbitration clause, with the result that the en-
tire arbitration clause is unenforceable and the case proceeds 
as a class action in court. 115 
• Two clauses (of forty-seven, or 4.3%; 6.6% of credit card 
loans outstanding) provided by contract that constitutional 
restrictions on the award of punitive damages, which courts 
have held are not otherwise applicable to arbitration awards, 
would apply. 116 
• Ten clauses (of forty-seven, or 21.3%; 40.0% of credit card 
loans outstanding) provided that the arbitrator had the au-
thority to award all remedies available under applicable law, 
and another five (of forty-seven, or 10.6%; 6.4% of credit 
card loans outstanding) specified that all remedies that were 
available in court would also be available in arbitration. In 
one respect, those provisions might be seen as limitations on 
remedies that otherwise could be available in arbitration, be-
cause courts have held that arbitrators are not limited in 
115. Class Actions in Arbitration-An Idea Whose Time Should Pass, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, 
Aug. 2006, at 25 (interview with Lewis Goldfarb); see also Patrick E. Gaas, The Evolving Unpredicta-
bility of Class Arbitration, FOR THE DEFENSE, June 2005, at 37, 39 ("[C]lass arbitration may be 
worse for the corporate defendant than class action litigation."). 
116. See Hadel man v. DeLuca, 876 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (Conn. 2005); MedValUSA Health 
Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 429 (Conn. 2005). 
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fashioning remedies to the remedies courts can award. 117 On 
the other hand, given that arbitration clauses have been criti-
cized as denying consumers remedies that would be available 
to them in court, 118 these provisions also might be seen as 
protecting the rights of cardholders by ensuring that the 
same remedies are available in arbitration as in court. 
• Of the clauses in the sample, seven (of forty-seven, or 14.9%; 
40.1% of credit card loans outstanding) expressly provided 
that parties can be represented by counsel in arbitration; the 
rest of the clauses did not address the issue. 
• Six clauses (of forty-seven, or 12.8%; 52.2% of credit card 
loans outstanding) expressly authorized the arbitrator to pro-
tect the confidentiality of customer information upon re-
quest. 
6. Arbitration costs 
Because arbitration is private rather than public dispute resolu-
tion, parties to the arbitration proceeding must pay the full cost of 
the process. 119 Typically, when a party files a claim in arbitration, it 
must pay at least some of the administrative fees upfront and put 
down a deposit to cover expected arbitrator's fees. 12° For larger 
claims, these upfront costs can exceed the costs of filing a compara-
ble case in court. For smaller claims, both the AAA and JAMS cap 
the costs to consumers. For all claims, providers may waive their 
fees in the event of hardship. 121 Nonetheless, a number of court de-
cisions have invalidated arbitration agreements on the ground that 
they imposed excessive costs on consumers. 122 
117. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, lnc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1001-02 (Cal. 
1994). 
118. E.g., Carrington & 1·-!aagen, supra note 30, at 344-45 ("Commercial arbitration, at least 
as it is practiced in America, is a method of dispute resolution, but not necessarily a method of 
enforcing legal rights."). 
119. By comparison, the public court system is subsidized by the taxpayers, so that parties 
do not bear anywhere near the full cost of the process. See, e.g., Stephen]. Ware, The Case for En-
forcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements--with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration 
Fees, 5]. AM. ARB. 251, 285 (2006). 
120. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 729, 737-39 (2006). 
121. !d. at 740 12; sec, e.g., JAMS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, supra 
note 88, at para. 7. 
122. Drahozal, supra note 120, at 752-57. 
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Almost all of the arbitration clauses in our sample selected either 
the AAA or JAMS as the arbitration provider. 123 Arbitrations under 
those clauses are subject to the provider's cost schedule and rules 
governing costs, which thus provide the backdrop against which the 
more detailed provisions in the clauses are operating. Beyond those 
basics, most of the arbitration clauses in our sample address arbitra-
tion costs to some degree, 124 but the details of the provisions vary, 
as can be seen in Table 8. 125 
Only one clause in the sample (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 0.1% of 
credit card loans outstanding) went as far as the clause in Concepcion 
in providing that the issuer would pay all arbitration fees. 126 Another 
(one of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 5.9% of credit card loans outstanding) 
provided that the issuer would pay all fees when the cardholder 
makes a good-faith request for assistance. 127 At the other end of the 
spectrum, none of the clauses in the sample required the cardholder 
and issuer to share costs equally. In its internal review of arbitration 
clauses for compliance with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, the 
AAA requires businesses to waive such cost-sharing provisions be-
fore it will administer consumer arbitrations seeking $75,000 or less 
because such provisions would impose higher costs on consumers 
than Erovided under the AAA's consumer arbitration fee struc-
ture.1 8 
A handful of clauses capped the fees for which the cardholder is 
responsible-at a fixed dollar amount (three of forty-seven, or 6.4%; 
1.4% of credit card loans outstanding); at the amount of court filing 
fees (one of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 13.4% of credit card loans out-
standing); or for small claims (two of forty-seven, or 4.3%; 0.2% of 
credit card loans outstanding). A number of clauses addressed the 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80. 
124. Five clauses (of forty-seven, or 10.6%; 0.1% of credit card loans outstanding) con-
tained no provision on arbitration costs, and one clause (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 5. 7% of credit 
card loans outstanding) stated that costs were addressed in the provider rules. 
125. 1n addition, every credit card agreement in the sample but one (forty-six of forty-
seven, or 97.9%; 98.8% of credit card loans outstanding) permitted the issuer to recover its 
costs, typically including attorneys' fees, for bringing a collection action to recover a past-due 
debt. Such provisions typically are not found in the arbitration clause, and, indeed, are found in 
credit card agreements that do not have arbitration clauses. 
126. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
127. Four clauses in the sample (of forty-seven, or 8.5%; 38.7% of credit card loans out-
standing) provided for the issuer to pay for one hearing day, while one clause (of forty-seven, or 
2.1 o/o; 0.0% of credit card loans outstanding) provided for the issuer to pay for two hearing days. 
128. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 78, at 313. 
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circumstances under which the issuer would advance the upfront fil-
ing and arbitrators' fees on behalf of a cardholder. (Fourteen (of for-
ty-seven, or 29.8%; 7.2% of credit card loans outstanding) contained 
no provision on point.) Again, the details varied widely, with the 
most common clauses providing that the issuer would advance arbi-
tration fees for good cause (eight of forty-seven, or 17.0%; 60.2% of 
credit card loans outstanding); would consider advancing the fees in 
good faith (four of forty-seven, or 8.5%; 13.5% of credit card loans 
outstanding); or simply would consider advancing the fees (ten of 
forty-seven, or 21.3%; 4.1 o/o of credit card loans outstanding). Final-
ly, just under half the clauses (twenty of forty-seven, or 42.6%; 
45.7% of credit card loans outstanding) dealt with how costs would 
be allocated at the end of the case, with the most common such pro-
vision stated that the issuer will reimburse the cardholder for his or 
her arbitration fees if the cardholder prevails or for good cause (three 
of forty-seven, or 6.4%; 38.8% of credit card loans outstanding). 
Provisions specifying the number of arbitrators also can affect 
the cost of the arbitration proceeding: three arbitrators will almost 
certainly cost more than one. Accordingly, in applying the Consumer 
Due Process Protocol, the AAA requires businesses to waive any 
contract provision requiring three arbitrators before it will adminis-
ter consumer arbitrations seeking $75,000 or less. 129 
In our sample, none of the arbitration agreements imposed an 
across-the-board requirement that the parties use a three-arbitrator 
panel to decide the case. Sixteen agreements (of forty-seven, or 
34.0%; 57.9% of credit card loans outstanding) provided expressly 
for a single arbitrator, and twenty more (of forty-seven, or 42.6%; 
21.0% of credit card loans outstanding) seemed to do so implicitly 
by always referring to "the arbitrator" in the singular. By compari-
son, one clause provided that any dispute would be resolved by "one 
or more" arbitrators, and three clauses refer to the "arbitrator(s)," 
leaving open the possibility that more than one arbitrator would be 
chosen but not requiring it. One clause (of forty-seven, or 2.1 %; 
0.2% of credit card loans outstanding) provided for a single arbitra-
tor unless the claim exceeds $250,000, while three (of forty-seven, or 
6.4%; 13.4% of credit card loans outstanding) provided for three ar-
bitrators only if the arbitration provider specified in the contract is 
129. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 78, at 313. 
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unavailable, otherwise leaving the decision to the provider and its 
rules. 
Table 8. Arbitration Costs Provisions (2010) 
Number of %of credit Type of Provision Clauses card loans 
outstanding 
CAP ON ARBITRATION FEES? 
Issuer pays fees 1 (2.1 %) 0.0% 
Issuer pays fees on good faith re- 1 (2.1%) 5.9% quest 
Capped at court fees 1 (2.1 %) 13.4% 
Capped at $50/$125 3 (6.4%) 1.4% 
Capped for small claims 2 (4.3%) 0.2% 
No provision 39 (83.0%) 79.0% 
TOTAL 47 (100.0%) 100.0% 
WILL ISSUER ADVANCE FEES? 
Issuer _Q_ay_s fees 1 (2.1%) 0.0% 
Issuer pays fees on good faith re- 1 (2.1 %) 5.9% quest 
Will advance on request 2 (4.3%) 6.0% 
Will advance on request (capped at 3 (6.4%) 0.7% $250/$500) 1----· 
~ill advan~ fo!:_good cause 8 (17.0%) 60.2% 
Will advance if consumer pays 
amount of court filing fees (capped 3 (6.4%) 0.7% 
at $325/$500) 
Will consider advancing fees in 4 (8.5%) 13.5% ~dfaith 
Will consider advancing fees 10 (21.3%) 4.1 o/o 
Will pay if necessary for clause to 
be enforced 130 l (2.1%) 1.8% 
No provision 14 (29.8%) 7.2% 
TOTAL 47 (100.0%) 100.0% 
130. One other clause provided that the issuer would pay either for the arbitration clause 
to be enforced or if the cardholder made a good faith request. The latter provision is the basis for 
its classification in Table 8. 
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HOW ARE FEES ALLOCATED AT 
END OF CASE? 
Loser pays 2 (4.3%) 0.0% 
Costs allocated in award 4 (8.5%) 0.3% 
Cardholder need not reimburse is-
suer above amount of court filing 1 (2.1%) 0.0% 
fees 
Issuer will not seek to recover costs 2 (4.3%) 0.1% 
or fees 
Issuer will reimburse up to $500 1 (2.1 %) 0.0% 
Issuer will reimburse up to $350 1 (2.1 %) 1.2% (or more if good cause) 
Issuer will reimburse if cardholder 2 (4.3%) 0.0% prevails 
Issuer will reimburse if cardholder 3 (6.4%) 38.8% prevails or good cause 
Issuer will reimburse if cardholder 
prevails or in other specified cir- 4 (8.5%) 5.3% 
cumstances 
No provision 27 (57 .4%) 54.3% 
TOTALS 47 (100.0%) 100.0% 
Table 9. Provisions Specifying Number of Arbitrators (2010) 
Number of %of credit card 
Clauses loans outstanding 
Single arbitrator 16 57.9% (34.0%) 
"The arbitrator" 20 21.0% (42.6%) 
One or more 1 1.2% (2.1%) 
"Arbitrator(s)" 3 6.2% ( 6.4%) 
Single arbitrator unless claim ex- 1 0.2% 
ceeds $250,000 (2.1 %) 
Specifies number only if provider 3 13.4% 
unavailable (6.4%) 
No provision 3 0.1% (6.4%) 
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7. Appeals and court review 
As noted above, a common characteristic of arbitration is that 
court review of awards is limited. 131 However, parties can set up an 
arbitral-appeals process if they wish, appointing a panel of arbitra-
tors to review the decision of the initial decision maker. 132 In con-
sumer and employment cases, some courts have found provisions es-
tablishing arbitral appeals panels to be unconscionable when they 
are one-sided-i.e., structured so that only the business is likely to 
be able to appeal (such as by limiting appeals to cases in which an 
award exceeds a threshold dollar amount). 133 
Just under half of the arbitration clauses in the sample estab-
lished an arbitral appeals process. Of the forty-seven clauses in the 
sample, twenty-four (51.1 %; 23.9% of credit card loans outstanding) 
did not set up an arbitral appeals process (although, of course, the 
award remains subject to review under section 10 of the FAA). Two 
of the clauses ( 4.3%; 0.1% of credit card loans outstanding) provided 
for an appeal if a right to appeal is available under the FAA, again, 
apparently adding nothing to the usual FAA grounds. But the re-
maining twenty-one clauses (44.7% of the clauses but covering 
76.0% of credit card loans outstanding) authorized an appeal to an 
arbitral appeals panel. 
131. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
132. For example, JAMS has an optional appeals process in its arbitration rules, although 
parties must opt into the process by agreement. See JAMS, JAMS OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL 
PROCEDURE Qune 2003), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
R ules/JAMS _Optional_ Appeal_Procedures-2003. pdf. 
133. See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 985 (Cal. 2003) (holding unconscionable 
a provision limiting arbitral appeals to awards exceeding $50,000): 
From a plaintiff's perspective, the decision to resort to arbitral appeal would be made 
not according to the amount of the arbitration award but the potential value of the 
arbitration claim compared to the costs of the appeal. If the plaintiff and his or her at-
torney estimate that the potential value of the claim is substantial, and the arbitrator 
rules that the plaintiff takes nothing because of its erroneous understanding of a 
point of law, then it is rational for the plaintiff to appeal. Thus, the $50,000 threshold 
inordinately benefits defendants. 
Compare Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1098 (Alaska 2009) (same), and Saika 
v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 927 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a provision limiting arbitral 
appeals to awards exceeding $25,000 violates public policy), with Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 
671 !'. Supp. 2d ll37, 1146-47 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting an unconscionability challenge to a 
three-member arbitral-appeals panel when review was permitted for all awards), and Marshall v. 
John Hine Pontiac, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232-33 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (same). 
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The triggering event for the availability of an appeal varied, as 
can be seen in Table 10. Nine clauses (of forty-seven, or 19.1 %; 
57.4% of credit card loans outstanding) permitted an appeal upon 
request, making the right to appeal available to both issuers and 
consumers. Seven clauses (of forty-seven, or 14.9%; 18.5% of credit 
card loans outstanding) permitted an appeal when the amount 
claimed exceeded a specified threshold (either $50,000 or $100,000). 
Given the added expense of an appeal, limiting its availability to 
higher stakes claims seems to make sense. And setting the threshold 
based on the amount claimed permits either consumers (who might 
make claims exceeding the threshold) or issuers (who might be sub-
ject to claims exceeding the threshold) to appeal. By contrast, five 
clauses (of forty-seven, or 10.6%) from small issuers (with 0.2% of 
credit card loans outstanding) specified the threshold (either 
$100,000 or $200,000) based on the amount awarded rather than 
the amount claimed. These provisions, while relatively rare, are po-
tentially problematic under the cases cited above134 because con-
sumers are relatively less likely than businesses to be subject to such 
awards. 
Interestingly, the arbitration clauses studied included a varying 
degree of provisions that might affect the scope of court review. In 
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattei, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 
parties cannot expand the scope of federal court review by contract, 
refusing to enforce a provision in the arbitration agreement that 
stated: "The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) 
where the arbitrator's findings of facts are not supported by substan-
tial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are er-
roneous."135 
One clause in the sample might run afoul of Hall Street. The 
USAA Bank Credit Card Arbitration Addendum (one of forty-seven, 
or 2.1 %; 4.9% of credit card loans outstanding) provided: 
The arbitrator's decision ... may be judicially reviewed on all 
grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10, as well as on the grounds that 
the decision is manifestly inconsistent with the terms of the 
Agreement or any applicable laws or regulations. 136 
134. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
135. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattei, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008). 
136. USAA Credit Card Agreement Arbitration Addendum para. A.14 (Dec. 31, 2010) 
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Table 10. Provisions Establishing an Arbitral A_pQ_eals Panel (2010) 
Number of %of credit card 
Clauses loans outstanding 
Upon request 9 57.4% (19.1 %) 
Claim over $50,000 2 1.8% (4.3%) 
Claim over $100,000 5 16.7% (10.6%) 
Award over $100,000 4 0.1% (8.5%) 
Award over $200,000 1 0.0% (2.1 %) 
If right to appeal under FAA 2 0.1% (4.3%) 
No provision 24 23.9% (51.1 %) 
The standard of review echoes the "manifest disregard of the 
law" vacatur ground, which is of uncertain validity under the 
FAA. 137 If manifest-disregard review is no longer available, this pro-
vision would have the same flaw as the one in Hall Street: it would 
specify a vacatur ground not listed in section 1 0 of the FAA. 138 If 
manifest disregard continues to be available, the provision would be 
superfluous. 
Other clauses might affect the scope of court review indirectly, 
by requiring the arbitrator to follow the law or to make decisions 
supported by substantial evidence. Both the California Supreme 
Court and the Texas Supreme Court have construed such provisions 
as limitations on the arbitrators' authority and have held that courts 
can vacate an award for excess of authority when arbitrators fail to 
comply with those provisions (i.e., make an error of law or decide 
without substantial evidence support) .139 By contrast, some federal 
courts have rejected this mechanism for obtaining court review of 
(copy on file with authors). 
!37. See supra note 69. 
138. The provision might still have effect if the vacatur action is brought in state court in-
stead of in federal court. See infra text accompanying notes 139-40. 
139. Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 606 (Cal. 2008); Nafta Trad-
ers, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84,97 (Tex.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 455 (2011). 
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arbitral awards as an attempt to evade Hall Street, 140 even though its 
use long predates that case. 141 Alternatively, rather than attempts to 
expand the scope of court review, these sorts of clauses might be at-
tempts to ensure that arbitrators do not ignore the law or facts in 
their decisions (or to reassure cardholders and courts that substan-
tive legal rights remain available in arbitration). 
In our sample, the substantial majority of clauses (thirty-five of 
forty-seven, or 74.5%; 94.0% of credit card loans outstanding) con-
tained some requirement that the arbitrators follow the substantive 
law in making their awards. The verbal formulations varied slightly 
(e.g., "must apply"; "must follow"; "shall follow"; "shall resolve"; 
"will apply"; "will render"), but the substance of the provisions ap-
pears to be identical. By comparison, arbitration clauses providing 
that the arbitrators were bound by the facts or were required to have 
substantial evidence for their decisions were much rarer. Only three 
clauses (of forty-seven, or 6.4%; 0.1% of credit card loans outstand-
ing) provided that the arbitrators were bound by the facts, and two 
more (of forty-seven, or 4.3%; 0.0% of credit card loans outstanding) 
required the award to be supported by substantial evidence. At bot-
tom, clauses requiring the arbitrators to follow the law were com-
mon in the sample, while clauses addressing the facts were uncom-
mon. 
D. Arbitration Clauses in Business Credit Card and 
Deposit Account Agreements 
A study by Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin compared the use of 
arbitration clauses in business-to-consumer contracts to the use of 
arbitration clauses in business-to-business contracts, finding that 
while commonly providing for arbitration in their consumer con-
tracts, businesses showed "a clear preference for litigation over arbi-
tration in their business-to-business contracts." 142 The difference be-
tween the two groups of contracts was substantial, with 76.9% of 
consumer contracts including arbitration clauses and only 23.7% of 
140. See Wood v. Penntex Res. LP, No. H-06-2198, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50071, at *20-
21 (S.D. Tex. june 27, 2008) ("This reading would impermissibly circumvent Hall Street."). 
141. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
905, 912-16 (2010). 
142. Eisenberg eta!., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers, supra note 36, at 876. 
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business contracts from the same companies including arbitration 
clauses. 143 
A limitation of their study, however, is that it compared very dif-
ferent types of contracts: consumer cell phone and financial services 
(e.g., credit card) contracts with business transactional (e.g., merger 
and financing) contracts. 144 Indeed, because their sample consisted 
of contracts filed as attachments to SEC filings, by definition (i.e., as 
defined by SEC regulations dictating when such contracts must be 
filed), 145 the contracts in the sample were ones that were out of the 
ordinary course of business for the companies, the sorts of contracts 
one would least expect to include arbitration clauses. 146 
In this section, we undertake a different comparison between 
consumer and business contracts, one that avoids this limitation of 
the Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin study but one that has its own 
limitations. Here, we compare the use of arbitration clauses in con-
sumer credit card agreements (as described above) and consumer 
deposit account agreements with the use of arbitration clauses in 
business credit card and deposit account agreements. As such, we 
compare comparable (in many cases identical) contracts entered into 
by consumers and businesses, avoiding the limitation of the Eisen-
berg, Miller, and Sherwin study. 
But our approach has its own limitations. First, unlike for con-
sumer credit card agreements, 147 no statute requires issuers to make 
business credit card and deposit account agreements available 
online. Some issuers do, but many do not. Accordingly, our sample 
is both limited in size and nonrandom. Second, the business credit 
card agreements we studied are between issuers and "small busi-
nesses," not large businesses. The same may also be true for the de-
posit account agreements we studied, although it is less obviously 
so. None of the agreements is individually negotiated, however; they 
are all form contracts. Of course, the definition of "small business" 
varies widely, with businesses of annual revenues up to at least $25 
million included at the upper end of the spectrum. 148 But, even so, 
143. !d. at 883 tbl.2. 
144. Some of the business contracts in their sample, such as licensing agreements, includ-
ed arbitration clauses at a higher rate. Id. at 878. 
145. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 38, at 458-59. 
146. Id. at 463-67. 
14 7. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42. 
148. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE 
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we do not compare businesses of identical or even similar bargaining 
power. Third, we do not know to what extent businesses are able to 
negotiate changes to the terms of the standard credit card and depos-
it account agreements we are studying. Similarly, we do not know 
whether, if the agreements permit cardholders to opt out of the arbi-
tration clause, businesses cardholders are more likely to opt out than 
consumer cardholders. For either reason it may be that the provi-
sions we are observing are not the provisions of the actual contracts 
entered into between business and issuers. Subject to these limita-
tions, our results follow. 
1. Business credit card agreements 
To obtain business credit card agreements (or information about 
the terms of those agreements), we reviewed the web pages of issu-
ers that used arbitration clauses in their consumer arbitration 
agreements as of December 31, 2009. 149 We focused on those issu-
ers because we are interested in whether issuers that required con-
sumer cardholders to arbitrate disputes also required business card-
holders to arbitrate disputes. Only eight of the issuers made copies 
of their business credit card agreements available online. An addi-
tional eight of the issuers provided disclosure statements for busi-
ness credit card agreements. However, as discussed earlier, 150 issu-
ers do not always disclose the use of arbitration agreements in their 
USE OF CREDIT CARDS BY SMALL BUSINESSES AND THE CREDIT CARD MARKET FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 
16 (2010), available at http:/ /www.federalreserve.gov /newsevents/conferences/sbc _ smallbusine 
sscredit.pdf ("Each issuer that Board staff spoke with had a unique definition of the term 'small 
business.' Definitions were based on annual revenue and the number of employees. The maxi-
mum revenue to be considered a small business ranged from $5 million to $20 million, and the 
employee limit ranged from 10 to 100."); SUSAN HERBST-MURPHY, GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS: 
COMMERCIAL CARDS IN BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS PAYMENTS ll (20ll), available at 
http://www. philadelphiafed.org /payment -cards-center/publications/ discussion-papers/20 ll/D-
2011-Commerciai-Cards.pdf ("There is no universally accepted definition of small busi-
ness .... MasterCard's website defines small businesses as those with less than $10 million in 
revenues, while Visa's site indicates a higher threshold of $25 million. Bank issuers of Visa and 
MasterCard cards are not obliged, however, to use the network definition, nor is there con-
sistency from one bank to the next on the parameters determining 'small business.' What is 
considered a small business by one banking organization might be classified as middle market by 
another."). 
149. The documents we obtained were ones posted on the issuers' web pages as of May 
2011. We do not know whether the issuers' consumer agreements might have changed between 
December 31, 2010, (the latest date for which we have data) and May 2011. 
150. See supra note 57. 
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credit card disclosure documents. If the disclosure document indi-
cates that the agreement includes an arbitration clause, we can be 
confident that it does so. But if the disclosure document is silent, we 
cannot assume that the agreement does not include an arbitration 
clause. 
Our findings are summarized in Table 11. 151 Two of the sixteen 
issuers were among the settling defendants in Ross v. Bank of America, 
and so have agreed to remove arbitration clauses from their consum-
er and small business credit card agreements. 152 Our findings are 
what would be expected given the settlement: one issuer's business 
credit card agreement does not have an arbitration clause and the 
disclosure statement of the other does not mention arbitration. 
Of the remaining fourteen issuers, eight (or 57.1 %) used arbitra-
tion clauses in their business credit card agreements, just as they did 
in their consumer agreements. 153 Four (or 28.6%), however, did not, 
and whether the remaining two used arbitration clauses is uncertain 
(the issuers provided only disclosure statements on their web pages, 
and the disclosure statement did not mention arbitration). Thus, 
roughly twice as many of the issuers we studied used arbitration 
clauses in their business credit card agreements as did not. But, giv-
en that all of these issuers used arbitration clauses in their consumer 
credit card agreements, issuers appear less likely to use arbitration 
clauses in business credit card agreements than consumer credit card 
agreements (although definitive conclusions are impossible given the 
small sample size and other limitations of our data). 
151. We report only the number of agreements because we do not have data on business 
credit card loans outstanding. 
152. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement with Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. and Capi-
tal One, N.A., C[C[ 3(aJ & 2(k), Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), No. 05-cv-7116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
23, 2010), available at http://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/2010-02-23-
stip-and-agreement-with-capital-one.pdf; Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with JPMor-
gan Chase & Co. and Chase Bank USA, N.A., C[C[ 3(a) & 2(k), Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 
No. 05-cv-7116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.arbitration.ccf settle-
men t.com/ documents/files/20 1 0-02-23-sti p-and-agreement -with-chase. pdf. 
153. Of the three issuers for which we have agreements, two use identical arbitration 
clauses in their consumer and business credit card agreements, while one uses a somewhat sim-
pler clause in its business credit card agreement. 
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Table 11. Use of Arbitration Clauses in Business and Consumer 
Credit Card Agreements 
Arbitration 
Arbitration Clause in Consum- Clause in Busi-
er Credit Card Agreement? ness Credit Card 
Agreement? 
As of As of As of 5/1/11 Number of Is-12/31/09 12/31/10 suers 
Yes 0 (0.0%) 
YES NO No 1 (50.0%) Uncertain 1 (50.0%) 
TOTAL 2 (100.0%) 
Yes 8 (57.1%) 
YES YES No 4 (28.6%) Uncertain 2 (14.3%) 
TOTAL 14 (100.0%) 
2. Business deposit account agreements 
Because the data are so limited for business credit card agree-
ments, we also reviewed the websites of the same issuers for busi-
ness and consumer deposit account agreements. Fourteen of the is-
suers made their consumer and business deposit account agreements 
available online. 154 We added to the sample the deposit account 
agreements from another issuer, Amegy Bank of Texas. In our analy-
sis of credit card agreements, we consolidated Amegy Bank with Zi-
ons Bank because they are commonly owned and used an identical 
arbitration clause. Here, we treat them separately because they used 
different deposit account agreements. 155 Accordingly, our sample in-
cludes fifteen issuers for which we have consumer and business de-
posit account agreements. 
Table 12 summarizes our findings. Nine (of fifteen, or 60.0%) of 
the financial institutions in the sample used arbitration clauses in 
154. Although we do not include Citibank in the sample because a copy of its business 
deposit account agreement was not available online, it appears that Citibank includes (or at least 
included) an arbitration clause in its business deposit account agreement. See Citibank, N.A. v. 
Stok & Assocs., No. 09-13556,2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14912, at *2 (11th Cir. july 20, 2010) (per 
curiam), cert. dismissed, 131 S. Ct. 2955 (2011). 
155. See Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, supra note 23, at 
553 (describing when commonly owned issuers were consolidated in defining the sample). 
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both their consumer and their business account agreements. 156 Con-
versely, four (of fifteen, or 26. 7%) did not use arbitration clauses in 
either of the agreements. (Three of those agreements instead had a 
jury trial waiver; one had no provision.) Thus, thirteen of the fifteen 
(or 86.7%) financial institutions in the sample specified the same 
means of dispute resolution in their business deposit account 
agreements as in their consumer deposit account agreements. 157 
Of the remaining two issuers, one-Bank of America-used arbi-
tration for business disputes and not for consumer disputes. 158 Bank 
of America had announced in July 2009 that it was removing arbitra-
tion clauses not only from its consumer credit card agreements but 
also from other consumer contracts, including bank account agree-
ments.159 Unlike its settlement in Ross, which applied to both con-
sumer and small business credit card agreements, 160 the more gen-
eral change of practice by Bank of America evidently did not apply to 
business deposit account agreements. 
The other issuer-Zions Bank-provided in its deposit account 
agreement that either party had the option to use arbitration to re-
solve "consumer disputes," defined as consumer claims seeking less 
than $75,000. 161 The option to arbitrate did not apply to business 
claims or consumer claims above $75,000. For all claims, the agree-
ment included a jury trial waiver and a class action waiver. 162 
156. Indeed, the financial institutions often used the same deposit account agreements for 
both businesses and consumers. 
157. In all but one case, the arbitration clauses were identical for businesses as for con-
sumers. The one exception is Wells Fargo, which included a different arbitration clause in its 
Business Account Agreement than in its Consumer Account Agreement. Compare Wells Fargo, 
Business Account Agreement 4-6 (Sept. 24, 2010) (copy on file with authors), with Wells Fargo, 
Consumer Account Agreement 4-6 (Mar. 17, 2010) (copy on file with authors). That said, in 
substance the agreements were very similar, and the differences might be due to the differing 
effective dates on the copies available to us rather than any decision to treat business and con-
sumer accountholders differently. 
158. See Bank of America, Deposit Agreement and Disclosures para. XXIV(E) Qune 19, 
2010) (copy on file with authors) ("This section on arbitration applies to business accounts 
False"); id. Cf XXIV(B) ("JURY TRIAL WAIVER FOR PERSONAL ACCOUNTS"). 
159. See Chu, supra note 55 ("In the industry's latest shift away from controversial forced 
arbitration clauses, Bank of America said Thursday that it will no longer require credit card, bank 
account and auto loan customers to sign away their right to sue.") (emphasis added); Robin 
Side!, Bank of America Ends Arbitration Practice, WALL ST. j. (Aug. 14, 2009), 
http:/ I online. wsj.com/article/SBI250 19071289429913.html (same). 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. 
161. Zions Bank, Deposit Agreement 13 Quly 2010) (copy on file with authors). 
162. The agreement added that if a court holds the jury trial waiver unenforceable, "any 
party hereto may require that said dispute be resolved by binding arbitration." !d. 
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Table 12. Use of Arbitration Clauses in Business and Consumer De-
posit Account Agreements (2011) 
Number of Financial In-
stitutions 
Both agreements contain an arbitration 9 
clause (60.0%) 
Neither agreement contains an arbitra- 4 
tion clause (26.7%) 
Arbitration clause in business agree- 1 
ment; jury trial waiver in consumer (6.7%) 
agreement 
Jury trial waiver in business agreement; 1 
arbitration clause in consumer agree- (6.7%) 
ment (claims under $75,000) 
* * * 
Overall, subject to the limitations described above, 163 we find 
that the business credit card and deposit account agreements in our 
sample are less likely than consumer credit card and deposit account 
agreements to include arbitration agreements-although in the case 
of deposit account agreements, the difference is slight. That said, the 
difference we find is much less dramatic than that found by Eisen-
berg, Miller, and Sherwin. It may be that the two sets of findings 
bracket the actual relationship: the Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin 
findings might understate the degree of correspondence because they 
were comparing different types of contracts; ours might overstate the 
degree of correspondence because we do not compare parties with 
equal bargaining power. 
Ill. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
This Part summarizes the findings in the previous Part and dis-
cusses their implications for legal doctrine, ongoing policy debates, 
and scholarship. After providing a brief summary, it considers four 
matters: (a) Concepcion, (b) legislative efforts to ban pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements, (c) possible rules on consumer credit agree-
ments issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and (d) 
future avenues for empirical legal scholarship on arbitration. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48. 
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The central empirical findings in the previous Part are as follows: 
Most credit card issuers (over eighty percent) do not include ar-
bitration clauses in their credit card agreements. As of December 31, 
2010, the majority of credit card loans outstanding (in dollar terms) 
are not subject to arbitration clauses. As discussed more below, con-
sumers have a much greater degree of choice in whether to arbitrate 
disputes involving their credit cards than commonly believed. 
A sizeable proportion of credit card arbitration clauses (68.1% of 
issuers; 98.4% of credit card loans outstanding) expressly permit 
cardholders to bring claims in small claims court. Most if not all of 
the others likely do so by providing for arbitrations to be adminis-
tered by either the AAA or JAMS, subjecting the arbitration clause to 
the Consumer Due Process Protocol (or the JAMS equivalent). 
Roughly a quarter of the agreements studied permitted consumers to 
opt out of the arbitration clause at the time they enter into the 
agreement. 
Almost all of the credit card arbitration clauses in the sample 
opted to have the arbitration governed by the FAA, either without 
mention of state law or to the express exclusion of state law. This 
finding suggests that the Supreme Court correctly construed party 
intent (at least as to credit card agreements) in holding in Mastrobuo-
no and Preston that a general choice-of-law clause does not incorpo-
rate state arbitration law by reference into the contract. 
Essentially all of the arbitration clauses in the sample provide for 
either the AAA or JAMS to administer arbitrations arising under the 
credit card agreement. A handful have a vestigial reference to the Na-
tional Arbitration Forum. As of the end of December 2010, then, 
credit card agreements provide for arbitrations to be administered by 
established, reputable providers. 
Despite predictions to the contrary, credit card issuers have not 
responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Rent-A-Center West v. 
jackson by including delegation clauses in their arbitration clauses. 
The reason for the lack of a response is uncertain. It may reflect sim-
ple inertia, a hesitance to give arbitrators authority over gateway is-
sues, or the fact that courts have tended to construe institutional 
rules as reaching the same result, perhaps making an express provi-
sion allocating authority to the arbitrator unnecessary. 164 
164. The latter possibility would not, of course, apply to provisions that expressly delegate 
authority to the courts. We explore the possible explanations for this inertia in a subsequent 
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While class arbitration waivers are ubiquitous in credit card arbi-
tration clauses, other provisions asserted to be unfair to consumers 
are almost nonexistent. None of the arbitration clauses specifies a 
biased mechanism for selecting arbitrators. Only a handful of credit 
card arbitration clauses, almost always by issuers with very small 
market shares, include provisions limiting remedies or the time for 
filing a claim, specifying a potentially distant forum for the hearing, 
or limiting discovery. Indeed, given the strong preference among 
credit card issuers for class-arbitration waivers, one would expect 
them not to include other provisions in their arbitration clauses that 
might result in the clause (together with the class arbitration waiver) 
being invalidated. 
Only one clause in the sample included a minimum recovery 
provision of the sort used by AT&T Mobility. Courts so far have not 
limited Concepcion to arbitration clauses including such provisions. If 
they did so, our data suggest that the decision would (at least in the 
short run) have a very limited effect. 
Issuers often (although not always) include similar provisions in 
their business credit card and deposit account agreements as in their 
consumer credit card and deposit account agreements. Issuers are 
more likely to include arbitration clauses in their consumer agree-
ments, but (particularly in the case of deposit account agreements) 
the difference is slight. We discuss this finding more below. 
To reiterate: these findings are limited to credit card contracts 
and arbitration agreements. Whether they can be generalized beyond 
the credit card context depends on how representative credit cards 
are of other types of consumer contracts. Moreover, the findings 
necessarily are limited to the time periods studied. Whether the 
findings will continue to hold over time, or whether subsequent 
events (such as the decision in Concepcion) will alter that conclusion 
remains to be seen. 
These findings have potentially important implications for an ar-
ray of legal, regulatory, and scholarly matters. 
First, our findings suggest that contract law doctrines premised 
on a lack of consumer choice may not apply (or may apply only 
weakly) to the use of arbitration clauses in the credit card industry. 
Most credit card issuers do not include arbitration clauses in their 
paper. See Drahozal & Rutledge, Sticky Arbitration Clauses (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors). 
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credit card agreements, allowing consumers to choose a credit card 
that does not require them to arbitrate disputes with the issuer. 165 
Moreover, like the AT&T Mobility clause in Concepcion, many clauses 
in our database contained some form of a small-claims carve-out that 
mitigate the claims-discouraging effect of an arbitration clause com-
bined with a class arbitration waiver. Not all courts are willing to 
consider the availability of market alternatives in ruling on whether a 
contract provision is unconscionable. But for ones that do, our find-
ings provide important data in evaluating the extent of such alterna-
tives in the credit card industry. 
Moreover, our findings also suggest a potential side benefit of 
Concepcion: it gives users of arbitration clauses with class arbitration 
waivers an incentive to make the rest of the arbitration clause as fair 
to consumers as possible. Indeed, Concepcion could be viewed as 
providing a goal to which they can aspire, and it will be worth watch-
ing to see whether, in light of Concepcion, financial services compa-
nies (or other users of consumer arbitration clauses) shift toward a 
clause more closely resembling that used by AT&T. 166 
We acknowledge several assumptions in our argument-that is, 
it depends on beliefs about a consumer's knowledge of her rights 
under the arbitration clause and a willingness to act based on that 
knowledge. In other words, the availability of credit card agreements 
without arbitration clauses may not make any difference to consum-
ers who either do not know about arbitration or who are not willing 
to choose a different credit card issuer on that basis. Similarly, devic-
es such as small-claims carve-outs and reward payments for prevail-
ing parties help overcome concerns that arbitration clauses coupled 
with class waivers can discourage the pursuit of valid, small-stakes 
claims, but not if consumers, despite having these rights, do not 
pursue these claims because they never become aware of these op-
portunities. Our argument also assumes that consumers actually be-
come aware of reward payments and other incentives designed to en-
sure that arbitration clauses, coupled with class waivers, do not 
discourage the pursuit of valid small-stakes claims. 167 Testing this 
165. As we have explained elsewhere, higher-risk consumers will likely have fewer such 
options. Drahozal & Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, supra note 23, at 564. 
166. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: 'Consumer-Friendly' Arbitration 
Clauses After A&T Mobility v. Concepcion, NOTRE DAMF 1.. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
167. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 605 (2010); Donna Shetowski & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolution 
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proposition, of course, becomes a difficult empirical undertaking. 
One would need some way of measuring the extent to which con-
sumers forego claims due to their ignorance about the provisions of 
their arbitration agreements. Some research has begun to delve into 
this area through the use of surveys testing how respondents react to 
a series of hypothetical cases. 168 This research holds forth some 
promise, but studying actual consumer behavior based on actual 
clauses would offer a more revealing method of testing the assump-
tion on which our argument rests. 
Second, our findings suggest that congressional efforts to restrict 
the use of arbitration clauses in certain contracts rest on some faulty 
empirical premises. As discussed above, Congress has enacted a se-
ries of laws prohibiting or restricting the use of arbitration agree-
ments in specialized contracts. These contracts include automobile 
dealer agreements, consumer financial agreements with military per-
sonnel, poultry wholesale contracts, employment agreements with 
defense contractors and, most recently, residential mortgage loans. 
More ambitiously, Congress currently is considering-and has con-
sidered for several years-the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would 
impose a blanket prohibition on arbitration agreements in consumer 
and employment contracts. 
Many of these laws and bills rest on a series of empirical premis-
es about the use of arbitration clauses. For example, the current ver-
sion of the Arbitration Fairness Act finds that "[m]ost consumers 
and employees have little or no meaningful choice whether to submit 
their claims to arbitration." 169 Our research suggests that such 
sweeping generalizations about industry practices are, at best, mis-
guided and, at worst, demonstrably wrong. Contrary to the above-
quoted "finding" of the Act, arbitration clauses do not necessarily 
permeate entire industries (at least judged by the credit card indus-
try as examined here). Even firms that utilize such clauses do not 
employ a "one size fits all" approach. Instead, the clauses display a 
diverse array of features, ranging from clauses with reward payments 
to clauses with "unfair" provisions that have sparked controversy 
among academic skeptics and consumer advocates. 
Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63 (2008); Donna 
Shetowski, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution: Why We Should Care and Why 
We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST.j. ON O!SP. RESOL. 549 (2008). 
168. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light, supra note 32. 
169. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 2(3) (2011). 
59 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
Moreover, the results of our study suggest that a blanket prohibi-
tion on the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is diffi-
cult to justify. Our study demonstrates that the contracting practices 
within the credit card industry vary widely. Some segments of the 
industry, especially credit unions, do not use arbitration agreements 
at all. 170 Moreover, among those industry participants employing 
such agreements, practices vary widely. 
When coupled with other data suggesting that arbitration pro-
duces results for consumers that are at least as favorable as those ob-
tained in litigation, the case for wholesale prohibition is a difficult 
one. This is especially true given the complete dearth of empirical ev-
idence suggesting that congressional prohibition of arbitration 
agreements in certain discrete areas has somehow made consumers 
(or the analogous party in the allegedly inferior bargaining position) 
better off. 
Our conclusion here is measured. Just as our findings do not 
support a wholesale condemnation of arbitration clauses (as urged 
by measures such as the Arbitration Fairness Act), so too do they 
not amount to an unqualified endorsement of all clauses in whatever 
shape and form. Rather, our findings support a more nuanced, case-
by-case approach to testing the validity of arbitration clauses. That is 
precisely the sort of fact-bound, common law approach facilitated by 
section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and the current doctrine. 
Whereas wholesale prohibitions like the Arbitration Fairness Act de-
clare entire areas of contract off limits to arbitration regardless of the 
terms of the agreement, the section 2 model enables courts to test 
particular clauses in light of their impact in a certain context, both 
with respect to the nature of the contractual relationship and with 
respect to the claim affected by the clause. Additionally, in the con-
text of statutory claims, a separate doctrinal defense-derived from 
cases like Mitsubishi, Gilmer, and Green Tree-allows courts to test 
whether a particular arbitration clause enables a plaintiff adequately 
to vindicate her statutory rights. To the extent courts conclude that a 
particular clause does not fulfill this purpose (as some courts recent-
ly have concluded 171 ), this approach permits a more modest check 
on the use of arbitration clauses without the need for wholesale in-
170. We explore this phenomenon in greater detail in a separate paper. See Drahozal & 
Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements. supra note 23. 
171. See, e.g., In reAm. Express Merchs.' Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
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validation of those clauses. Our point here is not to defend a particu-
lar application of section 2 or the "vindication of statutory rights" 
defense but, instead, merely to explain why, at a conceptual level, 
that model provides a superior, and more nuanced, method of regu-
lating arbitration agreements as compared to the blunt, empirically 
dubious approach typified by recent legislative enactments and pend-
ing bills. 
Likewise, our research does not necessarily disprove the case for 
targeted regulation. It may well be appropriate for Congress to con-
sider regulating certain features of clauses (like remedy limitations 
or cost splitting provisions) to the extent those practices are em-
ployed within the industry. We do not take a position on that issue 
here, for we do not believe our empirical findings yield a clear an-
swer to that question (other than suggesting that they are rare in 
credit card agreements). It may be that judicial interpretation of sec-
tion 2 provides an adequate mechanism for policing those agree-
ments without the need for legislative oversight. Moreover, volun-
tary self-regulation by the industry through the development of 
certain "best practices" protocols similar to the due process proto-
cols developed in the consumer, employment, and health care con-
texts, may be superior to legislative oversight. 172 Ultimately, if Con-
gress wishes to regulate arbitration agreements in credit cards in a 
manner that stops short of outright prohibition, a more complete 
empirical case is needed. 
Third, our research provides a possible model for the CFPB to 
follow in conducting its study of the use of arbitration clauses in 
consumer financial services contracts. As noted above, the CFPB has 
been vested with the authority to consider whether to regulate or 
even prohibit the use of arbitration clauses in credit card (and other 
consumer financial services) agreements. Before it can adopt those 
regulations, however, it must study the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in such contracts, and the "findings in such rule shall be con-
sistent with the study." 173 The CFPB has stated that its obligation to 
study the use of arbitration clauses includes "a study of the preva-
lence of such agreements," possibly including "the prevalence of par-
ticular terms in pre-dispute arbitration agreements" and "how the 
172. For discussion of these protocols, see, e.g., PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2012); Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 78. 
173. 12 u.s.c. § 5518(b) (2012). 
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prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the prevalence 
of particular terms within them have changed over time." This Arti-
cle presents data on precisely those questions for credit card agree-
ments, one of the types of contracts subject to the CFPB's jurisdic-
tion, and hence provides a model that can be updated and extended 
for the Bureau's study. 174 
Finally, our findings speak to the academic research in this area, 
especially the path-breaking work of Professor Eisenberg and his var-
ious co-authors. Part I explained what we believe to be the limita-
tions on the findings of Professor Eisenberg's research. Part II ex-
plained how our findings cast doubt on Professor Eisenberg's broad 
conclusion that companies such as banks systematically treat their 
consumer clients differently than their more sophisticated corporate 
partners. Our findings suggest that the differences in treatment may 
not be as stark as Professor Eisenberg and his coauthors suggest. 
These findings, thus, cast doubt on whether companies are using ar-
bitration clauses in their consumer contracts as a litigation-
avoidance device as opposed to simply a reasonable tool to manage 
litigation risk, just as they do in their business-to-business arrange-
ments. Our findings are by no means conclusive, as they have their 
own methodological weaknesses. But they do highlight the im-
portance of comparing, to the extent possible, comparable types of 
contracts between businesses and consumers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article contributes to the growing body of empirical schol-
arship on the use of arbitration clauses, particularly in the context of 
consumer agreements. Our analysis of arbitration clauses in credit 
card agreements has yielded important findings that, in some re-
spects, challenge the conventional wisdom about those practices 
within the industry. Most centrally, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, most industry participants do not employ such agreements, 
and, with the exception of class waivers, most agreements do not 
contain the sorts of provisions that have sparked so much controver-
sy among academic skeptics and consumer advocates. While we find 
some variation in practices between consumer agreements and busi-
ness agreements, those variations are not as stark as others have 
174. CFPB Request for Information, supra note 18, at 4. 
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suggested. Our findings identify a possible side benefit of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Concepcion and sound a note of caution to 
lawmakers who are considering prohibition or regulation of arbitra-
tion clauses in these contexts. 
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